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Understanding social information posits one of the most important leeway’s into being a 
successful member of society. The current doctoral thesis aims to shed light on the complex 
factors that facilitate and hinder this process, and the underlying neural mechanisms. Presented 
is an introductory chapter, three empirical chapters with relevant linking chapters, and a 
conclusive chapter. The first empirical chapter assesses the neural correlates of socio-political 
information processing across political orientation, in order to understand whether intolerance 
is accounted for by specific attitudinal orientation or opposing ideology. In this, no neural or 
behavioural variation is found in the processing of socio-political information across the 
political left-right, indirectly supporting the notion intolerance stems from ideological conflict. 
The second empirical chapter assesses the more specific role of the posterior medial frontal 
cortex (pMFC) in social conflict processing, specifically a role in conflict detection as opposed 
to resolution via behavioural amendment. Here is found that dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
activity (dmPFC) was sensitive to social conflict detection as opposed to conflict resolution. 
The final empirical chapter assesses whether as humans, we have a specified neural network 
and circuitry dedicated to social information processing exclusively. Using multivariate 
analysis techniques, it was found the activation patterns elicited in the ventral striatum were 
alike between monetary versus social reward. This indicates a subset of neurons responded 
similarly across both types of reward, signifying a common neural code in some regions for 
processing both social and non-social information. Collectively this knowledge can aid future 
research in continuing to decipher the mechanisms relevant to social information processing 
with more direction. This assists in not only the development of scientific understanding, but 
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Social information processing and the role of social neuroscience 
Understanding the social world around us is one of the primary gateways through which 
we assimilate into society. One must be able to attend to, encode, and understand social cues 
in order to make sense of, and appropriately respond to, the people and environment around 
them (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 2014). Though this process is seemingly transient across 
the typically developing population, numerous factors can disrupt this mechanism, and the 
specific procedures involved in the handling of social information remain still somewhat 
unresolved. The collaboration of social neuroscience offers additional tools to further 
investigate the basis of social information processing.  
 
“In fact, neuroscience might offer a reconciliation between biological and psychological 
approaches to social behaviour in the realisation that its neural regulation reflects both innate, 
automatic and cognitively impenetrable mechanisms,…” (Adolphs, 2003) 
 
Social neuroscience: a brief overview 
Social neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field interested in the association of social 
and biological factors, specifically the cognition, affect, and behavioural entities with neural, 
hormonal, cellular, and genetic entities (Cacioppo & Decety, 2012). Neuroscience involves 
the investigation of the brain and nervous system, whilst social psychology is a broad field 
comprised of two key elements, the study of intrapersonal level processes i.e. social 
cognition, and interpersonal/group processes i.e. social interaction (Cacioppo, Berntson, & 
Decety, 2010). Until the end of the 20th century, biological sciences and social sciences were 
not seen as mergeable. Social behaviour was vastly studied in the mid to late 1900’s, classic 
work such as Asch's (1952) “line” conformity study, Zimbardo and White's (1972) Stanford 
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prison experiment (for recent controversy surrounding this, though, see Blum, 2018), and 
Milgram's (1963) “electric shock” social obedience study (admittedly pushing ethical 
boundaries) made great progress in understanding some of the fundamental principles of 
human social behaviour. Nevertheless, these fascinating behaviours were not seen as direct 
reflections of biological processes, but of somewhat separate and irrelevant to “cellular level 
function” (Llinás, 1977).  
Cacioppo and Decety (2012) succinctly outline three key principles of social 
neuroscience. The first involves the concept of multiple determinism, which argues that 
specific occurrences can have multiple attributes and reflections across different levels of 
processing. For example,  the social psychology field has noted in detail social factors 
predicative of Social Anxiety disorder (for example Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 
2010; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994), and the biological/neuroscience field has also 
outlined several markers relevant for ones predisposition to the disorder (Klumpp, Fitzgerald, 
& Phan, 2013; Prater, Hosanagar, Klumpp, Angstadt, & Phan, 2013). The contribution of 
both fields makes for a more complete picture. Second is the notion of nonadditive 
determinism, arguing that single entities of an overarching mechanism cannot always solely 
relate to the whole. Meaning, we need to consider all information in conjunction with itself 
for any clear pattern or relevance to emerge, for example social attitudes and neural 
correlates. Ignoring the interaction between entities risks crucial mechanisms being missed. 
Last is the principle of reciprocal determinism, the notion that biological and social entities 
can reciprocally impact behaviour. For example, hippocampal volume is associated with 
greater spatial memory (Sherrill, Chrastil, Aselcioglu, Hasselmo, & Stern, 2018), but as a 
study on London taxi drivers shows (Maguire et al., 2000, see also for evidence of causation 
2003), plasticity of the brain means environmental influence (requiring memory of numerous 
complex routes) significantly contributes to brain structures, in that the hippocampal grey 
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matter volume of London taxi drivers is significantly larger to that of controls. Without the 
examination of all available information brought together via social neuroscience, important 
procedures and validation of social/behavioural models could lack.  
Though there exists an abundance of developing neuroimaging techniques widely used 
in the mapping of social processes to a cognitive and neural basis, the focus of the current 
thesis will be that of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques. fMRI was 
first introduced in the 1990s with early work by Ken Kwong (Kwong et al., 1992) and Seiji 
Ogawa (Ogawa & Lee, 1990; Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990; Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & 
Glynn, 1990). It operates by identifying the changes in blood oxygenation, coined a blood 
oxygenation level-dependant (BOLD) response, and flow in reply to neural activity, the basic 
premise being when a particular brain region is more active, it therefore expends more 
oxygen thus increases the blood flow to that area. Thereby allowing for functional mapping 
of brain regions active in response to particular events. fMRI remains one of the most 
frequent tools used in neuroimaging.  
 
The mechanisms behind social information processing 
Relevant to initially outline are the mechanisms currently understood for how we process 
social information on a rudimentary level. Perhaps first appropriate to consider is Crick and 
Dodge's (1994) model of Social Information processing, initially based on children, which 
outlines six steps. Briefly, the first involves encoding of external and internal cues from one’s 
surroundings. Second, attributions are formed from said cues to determine what motivations 
underlie the behaviour of others. The third stage involves selecting an objective to govern the 
preferred outcome, whilst the fourth generates possible responses and actions. The fifth 
evaluates said responses, assessing suitability for the particular situation, as well as the 
likelihood of a preferred outcome. Finally, the sixth stage is the tangible behavioural response. 
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Integrated in a later account of this model is more emphasis on the emotion and affect felt 
towards who we are interacting with in the first and second stages (see Lemerise & Arsenio, 
2000).  
A similar and parallel account put forward by Adolphs (2010) conceptualised social 
information processing into three wide-ranging dimensions: First is perception, this involves 
the basic input of stimuli from the world around, involving all our senses ranging from visual 
input such as face perception, auditory perception of speech, and olfactory perception of 
pheromones. All involve multiple and varied processing streams within the brain. Second is 
cognition, where we begin to make attributes and inferences regarding any input received in 
the first stage. This involves more complex processes, importantly, Theory of Mind (ToM) 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This is the application of mental states (broadly an individual’s 
beliefs, desires, knowledge, emotions, and intentions) to not only oneself but to others, used to 
understand and predict others’ behaviour. Importantly, it is this stage that our cognitive 
inferences, which are ultimately subjective, may bias information we receive (Adolphs, 2010). 
To give an example, research on attribution bias shows we tend to infer more favourable 
evaluations to ourselves and our in-group compared to the out-group (Hewstone, 1990). Third 
is the regulation of thought, emotion, and actions following the perception and cognition 
surrounding a particular event, so as to fall loosely in line with one’s social norms and values. 
This could involve external behavioural modifications linked to social conformity (Izuma & 
Adolphs, 2013), or internal controls on attention to serve goal attainment (Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012), for example. 
Since social information processing mechanisms deal with particular links amongst 
surroundings, cognition, and behavioural response, interference within any one stage has costs. 
For example, misattribution of another’s intentions due to bias can lead to further polarization 
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of attitudes. It is therefore important to gain an in-depth and rich understanding into the 
elements that can facilitate or hinder these working mechanisms.  
 
Influencing factors: psychological and neural mechanisms 
Many factors influence the manner in which social information is perceived, processed, 
and regulated. These can range from top down influences such as group membership to bottom 
up influences such as individual traits and social attitudes. Though there is an abundance of 
factors to consider, focused on here are some key influences relevant to the current thesis.  
 
1.1 Social Attitudes, Stereotypes, and Bias: Psychological accounts  
Relevant to consider the impact upon perceiving social information are social attitudes, 
stereotypes, and bias. Gilbert and Hixon (1991. p. 510) pertinently characterised stereotypes as 
"tools that jump out of a [figurative cognitive] toolbox when there is a job to be done". In other 
words, we utilise a body of information that is oversimplified, overgeneralised, and is quickly 
and easily accessible to process information about the world with moderate exertion (Allport, 
1954; Tajfel, 1969). Bias, commonly linked with stereotypes, is defined as an imbalanced 
inclination or prejudice towards a specific target. The examination of bias in the social 
psychology field is by no means a contemporary idea. Research demonstrates its effect 
vigorously within race relations (e.g. Crisp & Meleady, 2012; Crisp & Turner, 2011; 
Hutchinson, 2014), gender effects (e.g. Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & 
Handelsman, 2012; Wright & Sladden, 2003), age bias (Hills & Lewis, 2011; Levy & Banaji, 
2002), plus various other social and minimal intergroup paradigms (e.g. Van Bavel, Packer, & 
Cunningham, 2008). 
A particular form of bias relevant to the current thesis considers the general congruency 
of social information, coined confirmation bias. This typically refers to the pursuit or 
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construing of evidence that corroborate one’s own existing beliefs and world view (see 
Nickerson, 1998). Indeed, a relative amount of research has demonstrated this effect (Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2008; Knobloch-Westerwick, Mothes, Johnson, Westerwick, & 
Donsbach, 2015; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), an example of which comes from an 
experiment conducted in the weeks leading up to the 2012 US presidential election by 
Knobloch-Westerwick, Johnson, and Westerwick (2015). They found individuals exhibited a 
robust bias in selective exposure toward attitude-consistent online search results, spending 
64% more time on attitude-consistent messages, being especially pronounced among 
individuals that attached high importance to the issues. Relatedly, Sunstein, Bobadilla-
Suarez, Lazzaro, and Sharot (2016) found when assessing the effect climate change stance 
has on the processing of evidence for and against, climate change deniers were significantly 
less likely to revise/update their beliefs regarding evidence supporting climate change, and 
vice versa for pro-climate changers.  
Taken with the rising popularity of receiving information from an online forum (Smith, 
2013), this particular mechanism is important to assess. The readiness of information 
available on the internet means exposure to information that reinforces present outlook is 
arguably easier than ever. Not only does this somewhat stem progressive conversation 
regarding conflicting views, it also can lead to polarization of views, and ultimately, 
intolerance (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013).  
 
1.2 Social Attitudes, Stereotypes, and Bias: Neural accounts  
Research has denoted the processing of information that disconfirms one’s outlooks is 
arbitrated by regions involved in error processing and conflict detection, particularly including 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), adjacent medial frontal regions and lateral prefrontal 
regions (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Greening, Finger, & Mitchell, 2011; Sharot, Korn, 
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& Dolan, 2011). Further, research utilising transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; a 
neuroimaging technique that uses magnetic fields to stimulate or inhibit brain activity) to 
supress activity in the medial prefrontal cortex found this reduced participants ability to 
successfully update inconsistent information about others during an impression update task 
(Ferrari, Vecchi, Todorov, & Cattaneo, 2016). Relatedly, and especially allied to the current 
thesis, Hughes, Zaki, and Ambady (2017) found participants were more likely to update their 
impressions regarding negative information during an impression formation task about out-
group members, but importantly not in-group members. Less engagement in the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC), temporoparietal junction, insula, and precuneus when processing 
negative information about the in-group was found, but again, not for the out-group. This 
suggests these particular neural structures are potentially important for updating one’s 
impression, specifically when information fits an individual's pre-existing ideas. This allies 
previous work that outlines the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC; encompassing the ACC, 
see Figure 1.1 for visual aid of key brain labels used throughout the current thesis) as being an 
important structure during  more general social conflict detection (Campbell-Meiklejohn, 
Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, & Frith, 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Izuma et al., 2010; Wu, Luo, 
& Feng, 2016).  
Offering an additional example utilising a different form of bias, Sharot, Korn, and Dolan 
(2011) examine the behavioural and neural effect regarding optimism bias (the belief more 
positive as opposed to negative events are likely to happen in the future, thought to be an 
adaptive mechanism that helps reduce anxiety and depression). Briefly, Sharot and colleagues 
found that when participants were asked to estimate their likelihood of being involved in certain 
negative life events (e.g. getting cancer, being involved in a car crash), when faced with the 
genuine statistics of events happening, participants were significantly less likely to update their 
beliefs about negative life events happening compared to positive. Interestingly, participants 
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who scored high for optimistic tendencies showed significantly less activation in the right 
inferior prefrontal gyrus (IFG) when processing negative information about the future. This is 
accredited to less efficient encoding by the authors due to the association with tracing negative 
estimation errors in this region.  
Overall, when individuals are particularly motivated (consciously or subconsciously) to 
maintain a particular world view (be that of optimism or political stance), conflicting 
information may not be encoded competently, primarily implicating regions within the pMFC 










Figure 1.1. Approximate representation of the pMFC, encompassing the dmPFC (green), and 
the dACC (blue) as referred to within the current thesis.  
 
2.1 Group membership: Psychological accounts 
As intensely social species, the notion of group membership is pertinent to consider when 
deliberating more top down attributes that impact social information processing. Group 
identities shape not only preferences, viewpoints, and behaviour, but also rudimentary social 
perception (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008). For example, and drawing from a 
similar example as above, people can recognise members of their own race more efficiently 
(Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Sporer, 2001). Crisp and Meleady (2012) explain the notion of in-
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group favouritism and out-group derogation as being an innate predisposition from early 
monocultural environments. Those who favoured the in-group and were less likely to engage 
with out-group members (potentially resulting in intergroup warfare, disease threat, or the loss 
of mating opportunities) were more likely to survive and reproduce.  
Interestingly, aside from more explicit effects of intergroup bias, passive and general 
perception can also differ between social groups regarding the same information. A classic case 
study to demonstrate this comes from Hastorf and Cantril (1951), who conducted an 
experiment following an infamous college football game between Princeton and Dartmouth. 
Whilst both sides were reported to have repeatedly engaged in vicious and illegal gameplay 
(resulting in several significant injuries on both sides), the authors were initially intrigued after 
student newspapers from both universities reported on what appeared to be ostensibly separate 
games. Following this, data was collected from students attending both universities, to further 
extract perceptions of the event. Results demonstrated that, even when watching a replay of the 
game, participants seemed to be “seeing” different games. For example, participants from 
Princeton saw twice as many infractions from Dartmouth, and Dartmouth saw one third more 
infractions from Princeton. The authors conclude that there was no such thing as a “single 
game”, but many different games that all exist within individuals. 
 
2.2 Group membership: Neural accounts 
Basic neural underpinnings of intergroup perception stem from research showing 
heightened activity in the fusiform face area while viewing own-race faces during fMRI 
(Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001), with the strongest effects being from participants 
with a higher sense of intergroup bias. Golby et al., (2001) determined that own-race biases in 
fusiform activity were due to superior perceptual expertise with own-race faces. Notably 
however, this concept has also been replicated in non-racial social groups, and even minimal 
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groups (particularly interesting is the effect upon assignment to an arbitrary group; Bernstein, 
Young, & Hugenberg, 2007), demonstrating in-group bias via facial recognition may rely less 
on perceptual expertise and can be explained by sheer social categorisation. 
Regarding the divergence of general perception found by the likes of Hastorf and Cantril 
(1951), neural correlates have also been found to differ between social groups processing the 
same information. To display this effect stems from processes regarding intergroup perception, 
an experiment by Hasson, Malach, and Heeger (2010) demonstrated that when participants 
viewed the same movie clip from the motion picture The good, the bad and the ugly, neural 
responses were similar both within and across participants. Yet, research shows when 
individuals view the same stimulus from polarized viewpoints, both perception and associated 
neural correlates differ.  
To illustrate, Molenberghs, Halász, Mattingley, Vanman, and Cunnington (2013) found 
that after dividing participants into groups, creating a competitive task of who could press a 
button faster, participants judged their in-group to exhibit quicker response’s than their out-
group when viewing clips of task performance in an fMRI scanner (even when speeds were 
matched). Further, this was correlated with an increase in inferior parietal lobule activation (an 
area associated with action representation; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002) when 
watching in-group members compared to out-group members. Hence, even when groups are 
seemingly minimalistic in nature, there still appears to be variation in perception, alongside 
corresponding neural discrepancies (for a review see Molenberghs, 2013). An additional study 
by Cikara, Botvinick, and Fiske (2011) scanned avid fans of the Boston Red Sox and New 
York Yankees whilst viewing a baseball game of the two teams. Adverse outcomes for one’s 
own team activated the ACC (associated with conflict monitoring; Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
Carter, & Cohen, 1999)  and insula (an area associated with emotion: Cunningham, Raye, & 
Johnson, 2004, conflict monitoring: Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Xiang, 
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Lohrenz, & Read Montague, 2013: and the detection, regulation, and attentional control of 
salient stimuli: Menon & Uddin, 2010). Conversely, encouraging outcomes for one’s own team 
activated the ventral striatum (an area heavily associated with reward; Delgado, 2007; Izuma, 
Saito, & Sadato, 2008; Wake & Izuma, 2017) .  
Ultimately it would seem that we experience the actions of our in-group differently to 
our out-group across a variety of scenarios. Understanding the underlying mechanisms 
surrounding intergroup perception can give rise to more specific predictors of discrimination, 
which is important for future designs of interventions aimed to reduce prejudice and 
discrimination. Importantly, as the research demonstrates more understated groups can 
provoke diverse perceptions, more subtle intergroup variation such as one’s political 
orientation is important to examine. The current political climate means attitudes are 
particularly polarized, and so understanding the basic mechanisms amongst more discreet 
intergroup processes are essential, deciphering underlying cognition to aid in a more well-
rounded understanding of social information processing. 
 
A need for depth, clarity, and specificity 
All of the above points toward the need for a more precise measurement of the underlying 
neural correlates of social information processing in order to further our understanding of some 
fundamental principles. Importantly, the specific mechanisms involved in handling particularly 
valent social information. This includes social attitudes and political perspective, and how we 
deal with socially consistent and inconsistent information. Since inconsistent information is 
related to a lack in subsequent attitudinal/behavioural update (Sharot et al., 2011; Sunstein et 
al., 2016), it’s especially important to investigate these underlying mechanisms. For example, 
though medial frontal regions are often outlined (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & 
Adolphs, 2013; Izuma et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2016), more specific understanding of neural 
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function is needed to understand if this relates more to conflict detection or impediment of 
behavioural adjustment. Beginning to understand key aspects associated with the neural 
response to inconsistent social information in general helps to clarify and build upon 
cognitive/social models that account for behaviour and information processing.  
Additionally important to elucidate social processing mechanisms further is an 
understanding of whether common versus specified structures are appropriate to understand 
the principles of social information processing. For example, do we process social information 
in a special way, with a dedicated system? This being the case, social models drawing from 
general or non-social research may be less helpful. For instance, the ACC is outlined to be an 
important structure in general conflict detection as evidence by Stroop/Stroop-like tasks (Barch 
et al., 2001; Bench et al., 1991; Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss, Thomas, & Posner, 2002; Kerns 
et al., 2004; Leung, Skudlarski, Gatenby, Peterson, & Gore, 2000), but also in social conflict 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Izuma et al., 2010; Wu et al., 
2016). If social information is specialised, the circuitry and involvement of the dACC may be 
more diverse and/or separate for social stimuli compared to non-social. Understanding if social 
information is exclusively processed, future research can aim to focus paradigms onto socially 
pertinent stimuli exclusively to gain a more scrutinised insight into the specific neural structure, 
function, and circuitry associated.  
Therefore, what can be seen from the above literature review is a general need for depth, 
clarification, and specificity on some unresolved technical questions. Though in some cases 
the social field has gone into detail to theorise the mechanisms involved, and the neuroscientific 
field has begun to represent these processes on a neural level, there remains gaps in some of 





Thesis Outline and Aim 
The current thesis can be thought as overall adding essential knowledge into how humans 
process particularly valent social information. Within that can be considered two main themes; 
the first being an in-depth investigation into the neural and cognitive principles associated with 
predetermined social attitudes and the perception of inconsistent information. Second is the 
more general idea of a specified social system dedicated to exclusively social information 
processing. Presented are three empirical chapters in the form of submitted (Chapter 2) and 
published (Chapter 4 & Chapter 6) manuscripts in peer reviewed journals.  
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) uses neuroimaging methods to answer a 
psychological question where the social psychology field may fall short. Fairley recent ongoing 
debates argue whether the notion of intolerance is predicted via specific attitudinal orientation, 
particularly politically liberal versus conservative. Past research describes mechanisms typical 
of conservative orientation such as traditionalism (the desire for previous/past social norms) to 
be associated with increased levels of intolerance, whereas more recent models describe 
intolerance as an outcome of more general ideological conflict. To gain an in-depth insight into 
the variation of intolerance across the socio-political spectrum, the political left versus the 
political right were assessed in their behavioural and neural responses to opposing political 
stimuli. This allows us to examine the following concepts:  
- Do neural correlates reflective of managing politically inconsistent material shed light 
on the specific mechanisms involved in socio-political processing. 
- Can these neural correlates uncover any tangible disparity between how extremities of 
the political spectrum (i.e. left versus right wing) process politically inconsistent information, 
further examining individual differences in socio-political information processing.  
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) uses neuroimaging methods to assess a 
neuroscience question, examining the more general neural mechanisms involved in processing 
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socially conflicting information. The literature outlines the pMFC as a key component in 
processing conflicting stimuli and the navigation of any behavioural/attitudinal amendment. 
What is not clear is the specific role of the pMFC within or across these processes. Therefore, 
a paradigm eliciting cognitive bias was employed so as to dissociate the level of conflict from 
information more likely to be updated, allowing us to further disentangle the specific role of 
the pMFC. The group context utilised for this experiment is that of Japan and South Korea, 
appropriate due to the nature of relations between the countries whom have a long history of 
political tension (Izuma, Aoki, Shibata, & Nakahara, 2019; Lee, 1985), and now arguably due 
to high levels of online access, still maintain a distinct disinclination towards each other (see 
national survey report by Globe Scan, 2014). Specifically, Chapter 4 examines:  
- What is the more discrete role of the pMFC in processing socially conflicting 
information. 
- Can purposefully designed paradigms separate a role specific to detecting conflict 
versus the navigation of subsequent behavioural changes, previously conflated in the literature.  
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) assesses the concept of a specialised neural 
circuit in humans. What is not fully understood in the literature is if as humans, we have a 
system and neural network dedicated to the specific and exclusive processing of social 
information. Since evolution has meant social interaction, therefore social information 
processing, is imperative in terms of survival and success, considerable research argues for a 
specialised social system. This concept is studied by examining the neural circuitry for tangible 
monetary reward in comparison to social reward. This is achieved with a contemporary 
neuroimaging analysis technique in the form of multivariate-pattern-analysis, which assesses 
the voxel-by-voxel correlation of activation in specific regions of interest (ROIs) rather than 
overall univariate strength of activation. This analysis allows for a more detailed overview of 
the specific neural circuitry involved in any associated event. Specifically, Chapter 6 reanalyses 
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a previous data set assessing the univariate brain activation for monetary versus social reward, 
uncovering the following: 
- Do humans have a specific social circuitry for processing social reward in comparison 
to monetary reward. 
- Can the use of multivariate analysis techniques further aid our understanding of 
previously conflated mechanisms.   
The questions posed in this research are important to add to the scientific community but 
are also central socio-cultural questions that as a society, we require information on. Without 
high level understanding of the mechanisms behind the processing of socially pertinent 
information, particularly inconsistent or conflicting, interventions are more likely to struggle. 
Therefore, adding this knowledge to the literature will significantly broaden the scope of not 
only the impacts of social information processing as a whole, but also adds depth to some 
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Intolerance is classically argued to be patent among the conservative, political right. 
However, more recent models suggest intolerance derives from that of ideological conflict 
rather than specific traits aligned to political orientation. The aim of this study was to observe 
any variation in the neural correlates using both univariate and multivariate analysis techniques 
in the processing of politically inconsistent material across the left/right political divide. This 
was examined by recruiting both left and right wing politically engaged participants and 
observing their neural responses to politically inconsistent stimuli in an fMRI scanner. 
Behaviourally we found attitude extremity was positively related to political Intolerance scores 
across all participants, as well as increased activation in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and thalamus for inconsistent compared to consistent 
political material. The left insula, dmPFC, superior temporal gyrus (STG), and IFG show more 
similar patterns of activation for general political material (inconsistent and consistent) 
compared to apolitical material. Importantly, we found no tangible difference in the processing 
of politically inconsistent information between our two political groups. This data, though 
indirectly, supports the Ideological Conflict hypothesis, the notion that intolerance derives 








In the social and political psychology literature, intolerance (unwillingness to accept 
views, beliefs, or behaviour that differ from one's own) is typically argued to be most evident 
among individuals on the political right, as a consequence of psychological needs regarding 
the maintenance of social norms (“motivated social cognition”: Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003). The surrounding neuroscience literature has demonstrated variation in both 
neural structure and function between left versus right wing individuals (Amodio, Jost, Master, 
& Yee, 2007; Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011), but there still remains to be seen convincing 
evidence of both neural and cognitive discrepancy in the processing of inconsistent political 
material across the political divide. More recently, Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, and 
Wetherell, (2014) put forward a model coined the Ideological Conflict Hypothesis, which 
emphasises perceptions that contradicting beliefs are a threat to our own, rather than 
traditionalism (or other right-wing oriented traits), are key to understanding intolerance 
(Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Thus, it is important to better 
understand the neural correlates of managing inconsistent political material across both 
political groups in order to uncover the true predictors of intolerance.  
Social psychology has outlined classic traits representative of the political left and right. 
Liberals are argued to score higher on levels of novelty seeking (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 
2009), openness to experience and cognitive flexibility/ability (Adorno et al., 1950; Crisp & 
Meleady, 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Kemmelmeier, 2008), and conservatives tend to demonstrate 
an increased sensitivity to threat, creating stronger desires for traditional norms/familiarity 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Jost et al., 2003). Yet, although the left may be more likely to accept norm 
challenging views and the right may be more likely to reject them- this doesn't necessarily 
mean there exists the same skew of intolerance to directly opposing/inconsistent political 
material. For example, Crawford and Pilanski (2014) utilised a least-liked group paradigm (a 
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method whereby participants choose their least liked social group in order to assess levels of 
intolerance, rather than the same set of groups i.e. homosexuals, immigrants) and found no 
difference in political intolerance between US liberals and conservatives. This would suggest 
the cognitive process behind the managing of politically inconsistent material may actually be 
similar across the political groups. Since there exists at least several levels of organisation in 
the processing of complex social information, and only the end goal reaches any tangible 
measurement via behavioural analysis (Wilson & Bar-Anan, 2008), more in depth assessment 
may be required to elucidate further this question. The use of neuroimaging to conceptualise 
these types of effects help shed light on the underlying neural correlates and therefore more 
discrete components of social information processing. Within the current context this allows 
for a deeper insight into the specific processes involved in political intolerance, and any 
discrepancies between the political left and right.  
To begin to review brain regions associated with the processing of political material in 
general, an fMRI study by Zamboni et al., (2009) provides an interesting insight by having 
participants view both liberal and conservative statements in the scanner. They found that the 
processing of conservative statements was associated with greater activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). The authors speculate this could be due to i) the involvement of this 
area in complex moral decision making between self-interest and fairness (i.e. Cunningham & 
Zelazo, 2007; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006), or ii) a result of liberal 
responses to conservative statements- as the majority of participants were of a liberal/moderate 
ideology (73.1%). In order to gain a more balanced view of brain activity for directly opposing 
material, Kaplan, Freedman, and Iacoboni (2007) recruited 10 individuals who were registered 
Democrats and 10 individuals who were registered Republican during the 2004 United States 
presidential election, presenting them with faces from one’s own political party and faces from 
an opposing political party. They found increased activity in the dlPFC, anterior cingulate 
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cortex (ACC) and insula in response to viewing opposing political faces compared to faces 
from one’s own political party. These regions were also positivity correlated with the reported 
emotional feelings of the participants towards the associated candidates. The neural response 
is interpreted as activating areas associated with cognitive control (dlPFC, ACC) and emotion 
(insula), evidencing participants attempt at regulation when viewing opposing political 
material.  
Furthermore, Knutson, Wood, Spampinato, and Grafman, (2006) found when showing 
participants images of political party leaders (democrats and republicans) faces along with 
positive/negative words, ventromedial anterior prefrontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus, ACC, 
left precentral, superior parietal lobe, and dlPFC) were more active for incongruent (dependant 
on participants political adherence) compared to congruent and control trials. Brain activity in 
the frontopolar region was positively correlated with implicit bias and strength of feeling 
toward the politician, but strength of affiliation toward political party was negatively correlated 
with the lateral PFC (lPFC). The authors interpret this as a duel response for dealing with 
political information, one for processing more emotional and stereotypic information regarding 
opposing political material (i.e. vmPFC), and one for more reflective and deliberate processing 
(i.e. anterior prefrontal cortex). However, one issue with mPFC activation may be that it 
represents more a prediction error/conflict, which the mPFC is known to be sensitive to 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015), rather 
than more specifically processing inconsistent political stimuli.  
Additionally examining participants committed to either republican or democratic 
candidates in the lead up to the 2004 US presidential election, Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, 
and Hamann (2006) demonstrated the motivated reasoning involved in defending one’s own 
political affiliation was associated with the vmPFC, ACC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
insula, and lateral orbital cortex. Moreover, it has also been shown that when liberal 
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participants were presented with counter evidence aimed to change their political beliefs, more 
belief-countering trials were associated with dmPFC activity, and the most likely to change 
their mind presented significantly less blood-oxygen level dependant (BOLD) signal in the 
insula. Thereby suggesting those with more concrete attitudes were more sensitive to counter 
evidence (inconsistent political material) within the insula (Kaplan, Gimbel, & Harris, 2016).  
Although the research discussed provides great impact in bridging the gap between social 
psychology and political neuroscience (a term coined by Jost, Nam, Amodio, & Van Bavel, 
2014), the area still lacks an investigation into not only the neural basis of socio-political 
attitudes, but handling of strictly opposing ideology. One major limitation in the previous 
studies is that they heavily relied on reverse inference when interpreting brain activations. This 
can prove particularly problematic when examining functionally heterogeneous structures such 
as the insula and dACC, both of which were often reported in the previous studies (for a review 
see Poldrack, 2011).  
In order to address the limitation in the present study, we directly compare neural 
responses to politically inconsistent statements with 1) merely negative and 2) immoral 
statements using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA). One idea is that individuals may 
perceive politically opposing ideas as simply negative, resulting in similar neural responses. 
The second idea is that politically opposing ideas may be perceived as immoral or morally 
disgusting (Chapman & Anderson, 2013). Research has highlighted moral transgression to be 
highly predictive of general intolerance (e.g. see Wright, McWhite, & Grandjean, 2014), 
demonstrated to be more predictive of intolerance than non-moral forms of diversity (Wright, 
Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). Furthermore, to gain a better insight into psychological reactions 
to politically opposing ideas, when comparing neural responses to politically inconsistent 
statements with negative and immoral statements, we not only compare the strength of 
activation in a region of interest (ROI), but also compare activity pattern across multiple voxels 
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within a ROI using MVPA. A number of past MVPA studies have demonstrated that different 
stimuli activated the same brain regions, but activation patterns were different across two 
conditions, indicating that the two stimuli were supported by distinct neural (or psychological) 
mechanisms (Haxby et al., 2001; Wake & Izuma, 2017; Woo et al., 2014).  
A region heavily associated with disgust or negative emotion in general is the anterior 
insula (for a review, see Chapman & Anderson, 2013), and research has indicated some overlap 
in this region in terms of moral transgression/conflict (Greene et al., 2004). As stated above, 
the insula has often been reported in past political neuroscience studies especially when 
participants were confronted with contrasting political material, such as opposing candidate 
faces (Kaplan et al., 2007) and belief-countering stimuli (Kaplan et al., 2016). Though the 
insula is too a large and functionally heterogeneous structure (i.e. associations are made with: 
anger and fear, Damasio et al., 2000; anxiety, Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 
2004; and pain, Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000), it seems the association with socially 
emotive and both morally and politically inconsistent stimuli make this a rational approach for 
assisting in localising a ROI for comparing ideologically opposing/inconsistent stimuli.  
Therefore, the present study aimed to examine levels of political intolerance directly 
across left wing and right wing participants, comparing neural responses to politically 
inconsistent statements with negative and immoral statements in specific, predetermined ROIs, 
i.e. the bilateral anterior insula. This, alongside the use of opposing/inconsistent political 
stimuli equally across both political groups, generates a more balanced insight into the genuine 
predictors of intolerance that so far only the social field has begun to make use of.  
Accordingly, our hypothesis predicts i) stronger univariate activation within respective 
ROIs (i.e. insula) for both politically inconsistent statements and immoral and/or negative 
statements relative to politically consistent statements, ii) similar univariate activation as well 
as neural pattern identified via MVPA within ROIs for politically inconsistent trials across both 
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left wing and right wing participants, alongside no significant difference in average political 




Forty healthy university students who possessed strong political attitudes (either liberal 
or conservative) were recruited for the study. 7 out of 40 were recruited from political societies 
on the University of York campus (York Tories, Labour Society, Socialist Society, and the 
UKIP Society). Additionally, an online questionnaire was distributed amongst students, and 
participants that scored above a criteria cut off were also invited to participate (participant’s 
needed to indicate on a five-point scale they were “1= Very Liberal”, “2= Liberal”, or “4 = 
Conservative”, “5= Very Conservative”, alongside a score of at least “5” on a ten-point scale 
assessing strength of political attitudes, a score of “3” on a four-point scale assessing amount 
of times politics is discussed, and have indicated they have taken part in at least one political 
activity i.e. signing a petition). The following five participants were excluded from the analysis; 
One participant was excluded due to excessive head motion (>3mm), three were excluded for 
providing a moderate orientation rating on the day of the experiment (i.e. did not indicate being 
liberal or conservative), and a further participant was excluded due to inconsistent answers 
provided in the scanning session (indicating the participant was not/had stopped paying 
attention to the stimuli). The final sample consisted of 35 participants, 23 left wing orientated 
(12 female, mean age = 20.8) and 12 right wing orientated (5 female, mean age = 20.3). All 
participants gave written informed consent for participation, and the study was approved by 
the Research and Ethics Committee of York Neuroimaging Centre. It’s also important to note 
the data was collected between November 2016 to April 2018, during and immediately after 
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the election of President Donald Trump and Britain’s leaving the European union, a highly 
politically relevant period.  
 
Procedure & Task 
In the fMRI session, participants were asked to view a series of both political and 
apolitical statements/scenarios, alongside details of a picture of the individual 
responsible/involved (see Figure 2.1). There were five experimental conditions; 1) pro-right 
wing oriented condition, 2) pro-left wing oriented condition, 3) immoral condition, 4) negative 
condition, and 5) neutral (control) condition, with 24 statements included in each condition (a 
total of 120 statements). The politically charged stimuli were comprised of 24 pro-right wing 
orientated statements (e.g., Samantha, age 25, believes the rich are too highly taxed), and 24 
pro-left wing orientated statements (e.g., Alison, age 41, believes everybody should receive 
free health care). Additionally, 24 immoral or “moral disgust” statements were included (e.g. 
Oscar, age 22, and a group of his friends trip an old man and laugh), as well as 24 negative, 
non-moral statements (e.g., Joe, age 30, is forced to let the vet euthanize his terminally ill 
horse). Finally, 24 emotionally neutral control statements (e.g. Sam, age 30, sharpens his 
pencils ready to sketch a picture of a landscape) were also included. 
We included the immoral and negative conditions to compare the responses to politically 
inconsistent material (political intolerance) with immoral material (moral disgust) and negative 
material. Alongside the statements, participants were provided with the name, age, and an 
image of the individual (see Figure 2.1). This was to make material more authentic and 
ecologically valid to participants. Before the fMRI task, participants were led to believe that 
each statement was actually mentioned by each individual or reflected something that actually 




All political statements were selected based on a pilot study (n = 63, 38 female, mean 
age = 20). Participants were asked to complete UK adapted versions of the political statements 
used in Zamboni et al., (2009) and rate additional political statements (total n = 128) using a 
7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We selected the 88 political statements 
that were most highly correlated with participants' political orientation. Participants also rated 
the images of faces for trustworthiness and attractiveness using a 7-point scale (1= extremely 
untrustworthy/unattractive, 7= extremely trustworthy/attractive) and rated the Negative and 
Immoral statements for valence (1= strongly negative, 7= strongly positive), which was used 
to match across conditions. The combination between faces and statements was 
counterbalanced across participants for the main fMRI experiment.  
During each fMRI run, participants were asked to pay attention to each statement and 
further told they would be asked questions at random time points (to ensure attention is 
maintained throughout the experiment). Questions were presented, on average, once per 3 
trials, and there were 3 types of questions; 1) “How positive/negative did you feel about the 
previous statement?”,  2) “How empathetic did you feel toward the previous person?”, and 3) 
“How strongly did the previous statement make you feel?”. Participants had a button box in 
which they could rate on a scale of 1-3 (1 indicating a lower response and 3 a higher response 
on all question trials).  
Participants took part in four fMRI runs, each lasting 7.2 minutes, viewing a total of 30 
statements in each run. Each statement was presented for 6 seconds followed by an inter-trial 
interval (ITI; 4, 6 or 8 seconds, average = 6 seconds). In each run, 9 questions were randomly 
inserted. For question trials, the question was presented immediately after the statement 
presentation, and it remained on the screen for 6 seconds followed by the ITI (see Figure 2.1). 
Trial order was fixed for all participants (note however that we analysed the fMRI data based 
on whether each political statement is consistent or inconsistent with participant's political 
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orientation [see below] so that the order of politically consistent/inconsistent trials was 
different across the two groups of participants). Additionally, some of the participants also took 
part in a fifth fMRI run (a 13.3 minute video of various political figures), but this task was not 









Figure 2.1. Example of a pro-left wing trial followed by a question utilised for fMRI stimuli, 
as seen by participants inside the scanner.  
 
After the fMRI session, participants completed 2 questionnaires. First, a Political 
Knowledge and Interest questionnaire, including 7 “true or false” Political Knowledge items 
(adapted from Larcinese, 2007; i.e. Margret Thatcher was a conservative prime minister: true 
or false), and 3 items using a 4-point Likert scale measuring self-reported knowledge, interest, 
and amount of time politics is discussed (adapted from the Audit of Political Engagement, 
2005). Secondly, participants completed a Political Intolerance questionnaire, comprised of 11 
items (adapted from Crawford & Pilanski, 2013). For this measure, a least-liked group 
paradigm was utilised. This involves participants giving ratings on a group specifically 
opposing to them, rather than rating the same groups across participants (i.e. left wing person 
rating the same groups as a right wing person). The questionnaire used by Crawford and 
Pilanski (2012) was adapted to UK equivalents, i.e. “I think that the Democratic (Republican) 
+ 
ITI (4-8 sec) 
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Party should not be allowed to visit college campuses in order to register potential voters” was 
changed to “I think that the Communist Party of Britain (Britain First Party) should not be 
allowed to visit university campuses in order to register potential voters” (right wing 
equivalents that were distributed to left wing participants are provided in parenthesis). This 
provides a measure of intolerance towards opposing ideological view- rather than the same set 
of social groups, reducing the likelihood of measurement bias (for full set of measures used, 
see Appendix 1a & b). Finally, general demographics including Social and Economic 
orientation scores (7-point Likert scale; 1= strongly liberal, 7= strongly conservative) were 
collected. Upon completing the experiment, all participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid 
£25 or given equivalent course credits. 
 
fMRI Data Acquisition  
Images were acquired using a GE Signa 3T MRI system at York Neuroimaging Centre. 
For functional imaging during the sessions, interleaved T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequences were used to produce 38 continuous 3mm thick trans axial 
slices covering the entire cerebrum and cerebellum (repetition time [TR] = 3000ms; echo 
time [TE] = 30ms; flip angle [FA] = 90; field of view [FOV] = 288mm; voxel dimensions = 
3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0 mm). A high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted image (38 continuous 3mm 
thick trans axial slices covering the entire cerebrum and cerebellum; 512x512 matrix over a 
288mm FOV, voxel dimensions = 0.56x0.56x3mm) was also acquired for each participant.  
 
fMRI Data Pre-processing 
The fMRI data was analysed using SPM12 (Welcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience) implemented in Matlab (MathWorks). The first four volumes were discarded to 
allow for T1 equilibration. Head motion was corrected using the realignment program in 
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SPM12. Following realignment, the volumes were normalised to MNI space using a 
transformation matrix obtained from the normalisation of the first T1 image of each individual 
subject to the template T1 image, and then applied to all EPI images. The normalised fMRI 
data were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half-maximum) in 
the x, y, and z axes.  
 
fMRI Data Analysis  
A first level analysis using a general linear model (GLM) was run with the intention to 
identify brain regions activated in response to politically inconsistent statements. Data was 
analysed based on the five following conditions; 1) Consistent (politically charged statements 
consistent with participants political orientation), 2) Inconsistent (politically charged 
statements inconsistent with participants political orientation), 3) Immoral, 4) Negative, and 5) 
Control. Entered into the model was: 1) presentation of Consistent trials (duration = 6 seconds), 
2) presentation of Inconsistent trials (duration = 6 seconds), 3) presentation of Immoral trials 
(duration = 6 seconds), 4) presentation of Negative trials (duration = 6 seconds), and 5) 
presentation of Control trials (duration = 6 seconds). Other regressors that were of no interest, 
such as the Question trials, six motion parameters, the session effect, and high-pass filtering 
(128 sec) were also included. 
The first level GLM analysis yielded the following ten main contrast images for each 
participant, which were submitted to group level analyses (i.e., one-sample t-test) and MVPA 
(see below); 1) Consistent, 2) Inconsistent, 3) Immoral, 4) Negative, 5) Control, 6) Consistent 
> Control, 7) Inconsistent > Control, 8) Immoral > Control, 9) Consistent + Inconsistent + 
Negative + Immoral > 4Control (localiser contrast), and 10) Inconsistent > Consistent. In 
addition to the group analysis including all 35 participants, we ran another group analysis 
directly comparing the two groups of participants (left wing participants [n = 23] vs. right wing 
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participants [n = 12]). 
 
Correlation-based MVPA 
In order to gain a closer insight into the sensitivity of brain activity in response to 
politically Inconsistent stimuli, we also ran a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA). This 
calculated a voxel-by-voxel Pearson's correlation coefficients of activation for all five 
conditions (versus implicit rest) within each ROI for each participant. Correlational values 
were then fisher-z transformed and submitted to group level analysis (i.e. one sample t-test, or 
Independent sample t-test to compare between left and right wing participants). To reduce any 
risk of potential outlier bias, we also ran the same MVPA analyses using Spearman’s 
correlation, but it produced virtually the same results. 
 
Generating ROIs 
To isolate ROIs for both the univariate and MVPA analyses, we applied two approaches. 
Firstly, a statistical map signifying brain regions associated with negative affect yielded from 
a meta-analysis by Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, and Barrett, (2015) was applied to our 
localiser contrast image Consistent + Inconsistent + Negative + Immoral > 4Control. We 
included all experimental trials excluding Control so as to avoid manufacturing bias when 
comparing our ROIs between conditions (i.e. “double dipping”). Clusters which survived the 
set threshold (height p < 0.001 uncorrected, and cluster p < 0.05 corrected for family-wise-
error: FWE) were then defined as a respective ROI, from which four were created; the dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC: x = -10 y = 48 z = 30), the left superior temporal gyrus (STG: 
x = -50 y = -60 z = 22), the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG: x = -54 y = 18 z = 12), and the 
thalamus (x = -8 y = -6 z = 4) (see Figure 2 for axial slices of all ROIs included in analysis). 
Contrary to our expectation, we didn't find any insula activation with the localiser contrast. To 
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explore how the insula responded to each type of statement, we defined the insula ROI utilising 
Neurosynth (http://www.neurosynth.org/). We extracted the peak coordinates of both left and 
right insula activation provided by a term-based meta-analysis of 84 studies applying the term 
“negative emotional” (left insula: x = -34 y = 18 z = -2; right insula: x = 38 y = 20 z = -4).  
The beta values for each insula ROI were extracted via an 8mm sphere centred around 
each of the given coordinates, and the beta values for our functionally defined ROIs were 
extracted from the full clusters (left insula: 257 voxels, right insula: 257 voxels, dmPFC: 1316 
voxels, STG: 645 voxels, IFG: 963 voxels, thalamus: 340 voxels; see Figure 2.2). To compare 
both across group and between groups response to the experimental stimuli, average beta 
values were extracted from all ROIs from the group contrast images Inconsistent > Control, 
Consistent > Control, Immoral > Control, and Negative > Control. This was also applied for 
left and right wing participants separately, additionally including the Inconsistent > Consistent 
contrast. To control for multiple comparisons in our univariate analysis, all post hoc tests and 


















Figure 2.2. (A) Axial slice (z = -2) showing ROIs identified via Neurosynth, green signifies 
the left insula, violet signifies the right insula. (B). Axial slice (z = 27) showing functionally 
defined ROI dmPFC. (C) Axial slice (z = 10) showing functionally defined ROI STG. (D) 
Axial slice (z = 1) showing functionally defined ROI IFG (E). Axial slice (z = 1) showing 
functionally defined ROI thalamus.           A                         
D 




Behavioural Data Analysis 
Participants Political Knowledge measure was calculated by totalling the number of 
correct responses given. Participants Intolerance ratings were reversed scored where 
appropriate and averaged, producing a mean Intolerance score for each participant (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = 0.79). Social and Economic Orientation scores were also averaged in order to produce 
general Orientation scores for each participant. Furthermore, in order to assess strength of 
attitude, all left wing Orientation scores (Orientation, and Social and Economic Orientation 
separately) were reversed scored so as to directly compare with right wing scores, a higher 




Political Intolerance and Orientation 
Interestingly, a two sample t-test demonstrated significantly higher Intolerance scores for 
left wing participants (a higher score indicates greater intolerance) versus right wing 
participants (t(33) = 2.15, p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.77) (see Figure 2.3A).  Additionally, there 
was a significant negative correlation between participants Orientation scores (no reverse 
scoring applied so a lower score represents more liberal views, and a higher score represents 
more conservative views) and political Intolerance scores (r = -0.37, p = 0.03), suggesting the 
more conservative participants are, the less politically intolerant (see Figure 2.3B).  
Following up the Orientation score analysis, a two sample t-test demonstrated 
significantly higher Orientation scores (reversed scored so a higher score represents stronger 
orientation) from the left wing participants compared to the right (t(33) = 6.40, p < 0.001).  
To further examine if specifically left wing attitudes were associated with increased 
Intolerance, or simply stronger attitudes were, we ran a Pearson’s correlation analysis and 
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found a significant positive correlation between the (left wing reversed) Orientation scores and 
Intolerance scores (r = 0.44, p = 0.009). This suggests that the increased Intolerance observed 
for left wing participants compared to the right is more likely due to generally stronger 
attitudes/affiliations than specific left wing characteristics (see Figure 2.3C).  
Finally, we examined the relationship between social versus economic values across each 
political group. We conducted a 2 (Political Group: left wing vs. right wing) × 2 (Orientation 
Type: Social vs. Economic) mixed ANOVA, and found a significant main between-subjects 
effect of Political Group (F(1,33)= 40.87, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.55), a significant interaction effect 
(F(1,33)= 18.13, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.36), but no main within-subject effect of Orientation Type 
(p= 0.12). Intriguingly, our results demonstrate the direction of effect is opposing between the 
groups (see Figure 2.3D). The left wing group produced stronger ratings for Social 
Orientations, whereas the right wing group produced stronger ratings for Economic 
Orientations. 
Overall, this indicates the left wing participant’s are more extreme in their overall 
political opinions and Intolerance scores than are our right wing sample. Moreover, we 
speculate that the left wing sample place more emphasis on social values, whereas our right 




Figure 2.3. (A). Bars represent mean Intolerance scores for left wing and right wing 
participants. Error bars denote standard error of mean (SEM) (B). Scatter plot demonstrating 
negative correlation between participants’ Orientation and Intolerance score. (C). Scatter plot 
demonstrating positive correlation between participants’ (left wing reversed) Orientation and 
Intolerance score. (D). Bars represent mean social and economic orientation scores for left 
wing and right wing participants. Error bars denote SEM.  
 
Political Knowledge 
 The average number of correct answers across participants was 4.69 (approximately 
67%). We found no significant differences in the number of correct answers between the left 
wing participants versus the right wing participants (p = 0.13). The number of correct 
answers was also not significantly related to Intolerance scores (p = 0.21), or (the left wing 
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Self-reported Political Knowledge, Political Interest, and Political Discussion 
An independent samples t-test found no significant differences between left and right 
wing participants for Self-reported political Knowledge and Political Interest, but left wing 
participants conveyed significantly higher rates of self-reported frequency of Political 
Discussion compared to right wing participants (see Table 2.1 for associated descriptive and 
inferential statistics).  
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics of control measures; self-reported 
political knowledge, political interest, and political discussion.  
Measure Total mean 
(N=35) 












SD = 0.58 
3.17  
SD = 0.58 
3.00  





SD = 0.56 
3.61  
SD = 0.50 
3.33  






SD = 0.62 
 
3.91  
SD = 0.29 
 
3.33  





      
SD = standard deviation, *= p < 0.05, **= p < 0.01. 
 
Furthermore, across all participants (n = 35), Intolerance scores were significantly 
correlated with frequency of political discussion (r = 0.34, p = 0.04), but were not correlated 
with self-reported political knowledge  (p = 0.80), or political interest (p = 0.20).  These results 
suggest left wing participants openly discuss politics more than right wing participants, and 
this frequency of discussion is related to higher levels of political Intolerance across 






fMRI Results: Univariate analysis  
Left Insula  
A 2 (political group: Left vs Right) × 4 (condition: Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, 
and Negative) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect within-subjects for 
condition (F(3,99) =  3.98, p = 0.01), but no between-subject main effect of political group (p 
= 0.46), or interaction effect (p = 0.46). Post hoc tests revealed only a significant difference 
between Inconsistent versus Negative (t(34) = 3.96, p = 0.002), with no other differences 
between conditions (Figure 2.4A).  
Considering this result, we then combined the data between groups for further analysis. 
One-sample t-tests revealed the average beta values for the Inconsistent condition were 
significantly different from zero (t(34) = 4.66, p < 0.001), but the other three conditions were 
not significantly different from zero (all ps > 0.31) (see Figure 2.4A).  
 
Right Insula 
We conducted the same 2 (political group: Left vs Right) × 4 (condition: Consistent, 
Inconsistent, Immoral, and Negative) mixed ANOVA for the right insula, and it revealed a 
significant main effect of condition (F(3,99) =  3.60, p = 0.02), but no main effect of political 
group (p= 0.44), or interaction effect (p = 0.92). Post hoc tests again revealed only a 
significant difference between the Inconsistent versus Negative conditions (t(34) = 3.25, p = 
0.02; Figure 2.4B).  
We combined the data between the two groups, and one-sample t-tests revealed that 
none of the average beta values were significantly different from zero (Inconsistent p = 0.06; 














































Figure 2.4. Bars represent average beta values for all experimental conditions > control in all 
relevant ROIs, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, below asterisks refers to one-sample t-test, above 






























































































































A 2 (political group: Left vs Right) × 4 (condition: Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, 
and Negative) mixed ANOVA for the dmPFC revealed a significant main effect of condition 
(F(3,99) =  6.85, p < 0.001), but no main effect of political group (p = 0.30), or interaction 
effect (p = 0.36). Post hoc tests reveal a significant difference between Consistent versus 
Inconsistent (t(34) = -2.76, p = 0.04), Consistent versus Immoral (t(34) = -2.76, p = 0.04), 
Inconsistent versus Negative (t(34) = 3.38, p = 0.01), and Immoral versus Negative (t(34) = 
4.51, p < 0.001). There were no significant differences between Consistent versus Negative 
(p = 0.38), or Inconsistent versus Immoral (p = 0.62; see Figure 2.4C). This demonstrates that 
Inconsistent and Immoral stimuli activated the dmPFC at a similar degree, both more 
strongly than Consistent and Negative stimuli, falling in line with the studies hypothesis 
(stronger univariate activation for Inconsistent and Immoral material within respective ROIs, 
both relative to Consistent material).  
We combined the data between groups, and one-sample t-tests revealed that the average 
beta values for all four conditions (Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, and Negative) were 
significantly different from zero (all ps < 0.001) (see Figure 2.4C).  
 
STG   
A 2 (political group: Left vs Right) × 4 (condition: Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, 
and Negative) mixed ANOVA was conducted for the STG, and it revealed no significant 
main effect for condition (p= 0.09), no main effect of political group (p = 0.45), or interaction 
effect (p = 0.07).  
We combined the data between groups, and a one-sample t-test revealed that the 
average beta values for all four conditions (Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, and Negative) 
were significantly different from zero (all ps < 0.001) (see Figure 2.4D). 
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IFG   
A 2 (political group: Left vs Right) × 4 (condition: Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, 
and Negative) mixed ANOVA for the IFG revealed a significant main effect of condition 
(F(3,99) =  3.46, p = 0.02), but no main effect of political group (p = 0.37), or interaction 
effect (p = 0.13). Post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between the Inconsistent 
versus Negative condition (t(34) = 3.14, p = 0.02), but no other differences between 
conditions (all ps > 0.05).  
We combined the data between groups, and a one-sample t-test revealed that the 
average beta values for all four conditions (Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, and Negative) 
were significantly different from zero (Consistent p < 0.001, Inconsistent p < 0.001, Immoral 
p =  0.01, Negative p = 0.048, see Figure 2.4E).  
 
Thalamus  
A 2 (political group: Left vs Right) × 4 (condition: Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, 
and Negative) mixed ANOVA for the thalamus revealed a significant main effect of 
condition (F(3,99) =  5.87, p < 0.001), but no main effect of political group (p = 0.99), or 
interaction effect (p = 0.31). Post hoc tests reveal a significant difference between the 
Consistent versus Negative condition (t(34) = 3.15, p = 0.02), and the Inconsistent versus 
Negative condition (t(34) = 3.39, p = 0.01), but no other differences between conditions (all 
ps > 0.05; see Figure 2.4F).  
We combined the data between groups, and one-sample t-tests revealed that the average 
beta values for all four conditions (Consistent, Inconsistent, Immoral, and Negative) were 
significantly different from zero (Consistent, Inconsistent, and Immoral ps < 0.001, for the 




Whole brain analysis 
Finally, in order to more broadly identify any further regions specifically associated with 
viewing Inconsistent political statements compared to Consistent statements, we examined the 
Inconsistent > Consistent contrast across the whole brain (the two groups of participants were 
combined). However, no significant clusters survived the threshold.    
 
fMRI Results: Multivariate analysis  
To more closely analyse the neural responses to each condition, we ran further MVPA 
analysis. Since our hypothesis predicts that Inconsistent statements will be processed similar 
to Immoral statements or Negative statements, but significantly different to Consistent 
statements, we assessed the voxel-by-voxel correlation of activation between these conditions 
within the six associated ROIs. 
 
Left Insula  
 We found a highly positive within-subject correlation across participants for 
Inconsistent-Immoral conditions (t(34) = 23.98, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative conditions 
(t(34) = 18.29, p < 0.001),  Inconsistent-Consistent conditions (t(34) = 32.43, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Control conditions (t(34) = 18.82, p < 0.001)  (see  Figure 2.5A, and also 
Supplementary (SM) Figure 2.S1A for heatmap of the average coefficients between all 
conditions).   
To further investigate the relationship between correlations, we ran a series of planned 
corrected paired t-tests. It revealed a significant difference between Inconsistent-Consistent vs. 
the Inconsistent-Immoral (t(34) = 5.59, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Consistent  vs. Inconsistent-
Negative (t(34) = 4.08, p < 0.001), and Inconsistent-Consistent vs. Inconsistent-Control (t(34) 
= 4.53, p < 0.001). There was no significant difference between the correlations of Inconsistent-
 
 40 
Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Negative (p = 1), or similarly Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-
Control (p = 1). There was also no significant difference between the Inconsistent-Negative vs. 
Inconsistent-Control (p = 0.83; see Figure 2.5A). Interestingly, this demonstrates that the left 
insula may be more sensitive to political stimuli in general (both consistent and inconsistent) 
compared to immoral or negative stimuli.  
To compare patterns of activity between groups (left wing versus right wing), we directly 
compared the coefficients between left and right wing subjects via independent t-test. No 
significant differences between any of the correlations were found (all ps > 0.05).  
 
Right Insula  
We found a highly positive within-subject correlation across participants for 
Inconsistent-Immoral conditions (t(34) = 19.89, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative conditions 
(t(34) = 12.66, p < 0.001),  Inconsistent-Consistent conditions (t(34) = 19.34, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Control conditions (t(34) = 15.57, p < 0.001)  (see  Figure 2.5B & SM Figure 
2.S1B). 
Planned paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the average correlation 
coefficients for Inconsistent-Consistent vs. Inconsistent-Control (t(34) = 3.21, p = 0.01). No 
significant difference was found between the average correlation coefficients for Inconsistent-
Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Negative (p = 1), Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Consistent 
(p = 0.05), or Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Control (p = 0.07) pattern of brain 
activation. Additionally, no difference between the Inconsistent-Negative vs. Inconsistent-
Consistent (p = 0.06), or Inconsistent-Negative vs. Inconsistent-Control (p = 1) average 
correlation coefficients were found. This demonstrates that the right insula doesn't present 
different patterns of activation for processing politically inconsistent, consistent, immoral, or 
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negative material, but does present different patterns for general political material compared to 
neutral material (control).  
  To compare patterns of activity between groups (left wing versus right wing), we 
directly compared the transformed coefficients between left and right wing subjects via an 
independent t-test. No significant differences between any of the correlations were found (all 


















































Figure 2.5. Bars represent average correlation coefficients in relevant ROIs.  * p < 0.05, ** p 




















































































































































































































We found a highly positive within-subject correlation across participants for 
Inconsistent-Immoral conditions (t(34) = 18.56, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative conditions 
(t(34) = 12.55, p < 0.001),  Inconsistent-Consistent conditions (t(34) = 34.40, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Control conditions (t(34) = 7.57, p < 0.001) (see  Figure 2.5C & SM Figure 
2.S1C). 
Planned paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the average coefficients 
for Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 4.89, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Control (t(34) = 4.75, p < 0.001). There was also a 
significant difference between the average coefficients for Inconsistent-Negative vs. 
Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 6.50, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative vs. Inconsistent-
Control t(34) = 3.31, p = 0.01), and Inconsistent-Consistent vs. Inconsistent-Control (t(34) = 
9.16, p < 0.001). There was no significant difference between Inconsistent-Immoral vs. 
Inconsistent-Negative (p = 0.13). This demonstrates that the dmPFC may be more sensitive to 
political material in general, rather than immoral or negative material.   
To compare patterns of activity between groups (left wing versus right wing), we directly 
compared the transformed coefficients between left and right wing subjects via an independent 
t-test. No significant differences between any of the correlations were found (all ps > 0.05).  
 
STG 
We found a highly positive within-subject correlation across participants for 
Inconsistent-Immoral conditions (t(34) = 23.33, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative conditions 
(t(34) = 29.88, p < 0.001),  Inconsistent-Consistent conditions (t(34) = 42.42, p < 0.001), and  
Inconsistent-Control conditions (t(34) = 9.63, p < 0.001) (see  Figure 2.5D, SM Figure 2.S1D). 
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Planned paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the average coefficients 
for Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 9.33, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Control t(34) = 2.93, p = 0.02), as well as Inconsistent-
Negative vs. Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 6.89, p < 0.001), and Inconsistent-Negative vs. 
Inconsistent-Control (t(34) = 4.97, p < 0.001), and finally a significant difference between 
Inconsistent-Consistent vs. Inconsistent-Control (t(34) = 8.20, p < 0.001). There was no 
significant difference between the average coefficients for Inconsistent-Immoral vs. 
Inconsistent-Negative (p = 0.09; Figure 2.5D). This demonstrates the STG may be more 
sensitive to political material in general, rather than immoral or negative material.   
To compare patterns of activity between groups (left wing versus right wing), we directly 
compared the transformed coefficients between left and right wing subjects via an independent 
t-test. No significant differences between any of the correlations were found (all ps > 0.05).  
 
IFG 
We found a highly positive within-subject correlation across participants for 
Inconsistent-Immoral conditions (t(34) = 25.17, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative conditions 
(t(34) = 23.69, p < 0.001),  Inconsistent-Consistent conditions (t(34) = 47.50, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Control conditions (t(34) = 22.10, p < 0.001) (see  Figure 2.5E & SM Figure 
2.S1E).  
Planned paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the average coefficients 
for Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 3.95, p < 0.001), as well as 
Inconsistent-Negative vs. Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 4.20, p < 0.001), and Inconsistent-
Consistent vs. Inconsistent-Control t(34) = 5.27, p < 0.001). There was no significant 
difference between the average coefficients for Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Negative 
(p = 1), and Inconsistent-Immoral vs. Inconsistent-Control (p = 0.17), or Inconsistent-Negative 
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vs. Inconsistent-Control (p = 0.16; Figure 6E). This demonstrates the IFG may be more 
sensitive to political material in general, rather than immoral or negative material.   
To compare patterns of activity between groups (left wing versus right wing), we directly 
compared the transformed coefficients between left and right wing subjects via an independent 
t-test. No significant differences between any of the correlations were found (all ps > 0.05).  
 
Thalamus 
We found a highly positive within-subject correlation across participants for 
Inconsistent-Immoral conditions (t(34) = 14.68, p < 0.001), Inconsistent-Negative conditions 
(t(34) = 10.32, p < 0.001),  Inconsistent-Consistent conditions (t(34) = 19.81, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Control conditions (t(34) = 10.35, p < 0.001) (see  Figure 2.5F & SM Figure 
2.S1F). 
Planned paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the average coefficients 
for Inconsistent-Negative vs. Inconsistent-Consistent (t(34) = 2.70, p < 0.001), and 
Inconsistent-Consistent vs. Inconsistent-Control (t(34) = 3.01, p = 0.01). There were no 
significant differences between the average correlation coefficients for Inconsistent-Immoral 
vs. Inconsistent-Consistent  (p = 1), Inconsistent-Immoral  vs. Inconsistent- Negative (p = 
0.06), Inconsistent-Immoral  vs. Inconsistent-Control (p = 0.08), or Inconsistent-Negative vs. 
Inconsistent-Control (p = 1; Figure 2.5F). This demonstrates that the thalamus processes 
general political material similar to immoral material, but differently to generally negative 
material.   
To compare patterns of activity between groups (left wing versus right wing), we directly 
compared the transformed coefficients between left and right wing subjects via an independent 




Brain-Behaviour Across Subject Correlations 
In order to assess the relationship between our behavioural measures and any associated 
brain activity in greater depth, a series of brain-behaviour across subject correlations were 
conducted (p values are Bonferroni-Holm corrected for multiple comparison). We found no 
significant correlation between average political Intolerance scores versus brain activity for 
inconsistent compared to consistent trials (average beta values extracted from the Inconsistent 
> Consistent contrast) in all six ROIs (Figure 2.2; all ps > 0.16). Since political Intolerance was 
positively related to attitudinal strength, we additionally investigated the relationship with (left 
wing reversed) Orientation scores and brain activity, but found no significant correlation in the 
left insula (p = 0.64), right insula (p= 0.64), or IFG (p = 0.24). We did however find a significant 
positive relationship between Orientation scores and activity in the dmPFC (r = 0.45, p = 0.04; 
Figure 2.6A), STG (r = 0.44, p = 0.03; Figure 2.6B), and thalamus (r = 0.45, p = 0.04; Figure 
2.6C). This demonstrates attitudinal strength is associated with increased activation for 




















Figure 2.6. All panels demonstrate relationship between associated ROIs average activation 
for inconsistent compared to consistent political material versus average (left wing reversed) 
Orientation score. 
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The aim of this study was to examine any neural variation induced by political 
intolerance across left and right wing participants, whilst also investigating if material that is 
inconsistent with one's political orientation is processed similarly to immoral or negative 
material. This was examined by recruiting both left and right wing groups of politically 
engaged participants, and observing their neural responses to politically inconsistent stimuli in 
an fMRI scanner. Behaviourally, we found that attitude extremity was positively related to 
Intolerance scores across all participants indicating that stronger political attitude relates to the 
rejection of opposing political ideology’s. We defined six ROIs (the bilateral insula, dmPFC, 
STG, IFG, and thalamus; see Figure 2.2) that are broadly related to emotions in general, and 
our univariate analyses first revealed that inconsistent political material elicited activation 
strength more similar to immoral rather than negative material in all of the six ROIs except the 
STG, suggesting inconsistent political material is perceived as morally disgusting. But, the 
correlation-based MVPA demonstrated that across ROIs, the pattern similarity was generally 
the highest between politically inconsistent vs. consistent material, indicating more similar 
processing for political material in general compared to apolitical. Furthermore, there was no 
clear difference between the inconsistent-immoral pattern similarity versus the inconsistent-
negative pattern similarity, suggesting that politically inconsistent material was not particularly 
perceived as immoral.  Importantly, we found no tangible difference in the processing of 
politically inconsistent information between our two political groups. This data, tentatively, 
supports the Ideological Conflict Hypothesis, the notion that intolerance derives from opposing 
ideology, not specific characteristics of political orientation.  
All ROIs excluding the right insula demonstrated significantly increased activation for 
politically inconsistent material compared to neutral material across participants. These results 
fall in line with previous data demonstrating the role of the anterior insula and mPFC in 
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processing politically opposing material (Kaplan et al., 2007, 2016; Knutson et al., 2006; 
Westen et al., 2006). Activation of the thalamus for politically inconsistent material also 
supports preceding work, with the role of the thalamus mainly being described as an 
information transmission hub, relaying critical information from external (top down, 
environmental) and internal (bottom up) cues (Saalmann & Kastner, 2011).  
Further, the dmPFC, STG, and thalamus show stronger activation for inconsistent 
material the more extreme the participants attitude was, also echoed in previous literature such 
as Kaplan et al., (2007) who found neural responses to candiates faces varied in regard to 
feelings towards candidates, and Knutson et al., (2006) who found feelings towards candidates 
used in an IAT were related to increased frontopolar activity. The dmPFC can generally be 
attributed to behaviour/action monitoring and selection, and the social evaluations of others 
(Rushworth, Buckley, Behrens, Walton, & Bannerman, 2007; Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, 
& Bannerman, 2004; Talati & Hirsch, 2005), particularly left lateralisation (Talati & Hirsch, 
2005). More, the STG aside from being a key component in language processing (Bigler et al., 
2007), is also implicated in regulating social cognition via behavioural monitoring and 
assessment  (Adolphs, 2003; Bigler et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2004). Overall these regions, 
including the thalamus mentioned previously, seem to represent the transmission and 
processing of information relevant to assessing social items and subsequent behaviour. Thus, 
as individuals with stronger attitudes (regardless of political orientation) showed stronger 
activity within these regions for inconsistent compared to consistent political material (Figure 
2.6), this suggests a more prominent predictor of intolerance, and tool for future work wishing 
to examine the neural correlates of intolerance, is attitude extremity, rather than specific 
attitudinal orientation.  
Interestingly however, our experiment finds little evidence to suggest our ROIs process 
politically inconsistent material differently to consistent. Only the dmPFC showed increased 
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activation for politically inconsistent material compared to consistent material, with further 
multivariate analysis showing the pattern of activation to be similar for general political 
material (consistent and inconsistent). Thus, it seems that politically inconsistent information 
isn’t processed particularly similar to immoral or negative material, but may be handled via 
mechanisms more specific to political stimuli in general.  
Considered in conjunction with this is the fact that political material in general may have 
been more arousing to participants overall. Due to participants being especially politically 
engaged, and the advert of the study itself being centred around politics, it’s quite likely the 
participants were generally more interested in/anticipated more the political trials. This is 
reinforced with research by Cunningham, Raye, and Johnson (2004) who demonstrate the 
involvement of the insula regarding both negative and positive attitude valence, signifying the 
relevance for intensely valent material in general, not just negative/conflicting material. 
However, though this supports univariate findings regarding activation strength, there is 
research that infers distinct activation patterns regarding basic emotion (Vytal & Hamann, 
2010), and so this interpretation may not necessarily be applied to our multivariate finding, as 
it remains somewhat unclear whether socially consistent versus inconsistent (i.e. positively or 
negatively valent information) is encoded similar, and thus elicits similar activation patterns, 
across our ROIs.  
Since all ROIs examined demonstrated a significant positive correlation between 
conditions via MVPA (indicating the pattern of processing to be similar across all conditions), 
it seems relevant to consider more general processes participants undertook, for example 
sentence comprehension. A recent review (from 37 studies) indicates the engagement of the 
left inferior frontal and posterior temporal regions, and right insula, for the comprehension of 
complex syntax (Walenski, Europa, Caplan, & Thompson, 2019). Due to the complex nature 
of our stimuli, it is likely multiple regions will co-ordinate in a similar pattern in order to 
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process the basic information presented, which is why the use of control stimuli is essential 
when assessing complex (particularly social) neural processes. Furthermore, all trials 
undertook by participants contained images of faces, and research has shown viewing faces 
can stimulate right insula activity (Kircher et al., 2000), aptly where the least variation in 
activation pattern across conditions is seen. Additionally, the STG and IFG are also implicated 
in the input of the facial responsive network (for example see Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2000), and impression formation for human faces compared to objects is implicated within 
neural networks in the mPFC area including the STG (Mitchell, Neil Macrae, & Banaji, 2005).  
A key finding from this study is that no tangible difference is seen in the neural correlates 
of left versus right wing subjects when processing inconsistent political material, despite a 
substantial section of previous literature that might allude to such. This cautiously supports the 
Ideological Conflict hypothesis, but emphasis should be placed on the small, imbalanced 
sample size that reduced the current experiments statistical power. Of the behavioural 
differences that are present, this actually indicates increased political intolerance from our left 
wing sample, but there are several important factors to take into account. Firstly, the (left wing 
reversed) Orientation scores (a basic measure of attitude strength) for left wing participants 
were significantly more extreme than for right wing participants. Research has demonstrated 
that more extreme attitudes tend to induce higher levels of political Intolerance (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, & Zemla, 2010; Fernbach et al., 2013; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). This is 
supplemented by our findings that demonstrate a positive relationship between attitude 
extremity and i) political Intolerance, and ii) higher average activation for politically 
inconsistent compared to consistent material in the dmPFC, STG and thalamus.  
Although no convincing neural or behavioural differences regarding the intolerance 
towards opposing political ideas were found between our groups, indicating processes 
perceiving inconsistent political material may be more similar, our study does still provide 
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some behavioural evidence demonstrating classic differences between political left versus right 
general characteristics. Mainly, our left wing participants provided higher Social Orientation 
scores relative to Economic, and our right wing participants provided higher Economic 
Orientation scores relative to Social. This suggests an asymmetry in the focus on social versus 
economic issues between our groups. This compliments previous work outlining the 
fundamental traits of political liberalism and conservatism. For example, the left is 
characterised by high levels of openness to experience, novelty seeking (Jost et al., 2009, 
2003), and higher cognitive flexibility/ability (Adorno et al., 1950; Crisp & Meleady, 2012; 
Jost et al., 2003). These traits compliment an increased focus on social values in our left wing 
participants. Similarly, the right is characterised by high levels of sensitivity to threat (Oxley 
et al., 2008), traditionalism (Jost et al., 2003), a strong desire for order (Carney, Jost, Gosling, 
& Potter, 2008), and increased organisation skills (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & 
Barbaranelli, 2006), complimenting an increased focus on more economic and structural 
values. 
It should be considered an important factor that the participants for this experiment were 
all students, a demographic not utilised by Crawford and Pilanski (2014) who found no 
difference in intolerance between liberals and conservatives. Universities are notoriously left 
wing environments. For example, one survey suggested that eight out of ten university lecturers 
in Britain identify as left wing (Turner, 2018). This could mean the image of right wing views 
are stigmatised in a university environment, having a detrimental effect on right wing 
participants who may feel more hesitant about expressing their opinions. Conversely, it should 
also be noted that Wetherell et al., (2013) did utilise a student population for their first of two 
experiments, and didn't find a significant difference between liberals and conservatives levels 
of political intolerance. Hence, what may additionally be important to consider was the current 
political climate in 2016 (encapsulating some mass right wing populist movements; i.e. 
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“Brexit”, the US election of President Trump). Arguably in this context, right wing positions 
were more unpopular in liberal-orientated contexts. An example of this is the reported strong 
opposition to Britain’s leaving the EU amongst British Universities, with university graduates 
reported to be the most likely demographic to vote remain (see Kirk & Dunford, 2017).  
Overall, these results seem promising in potentially supporting the Ideological Conflict 
hypothesis (Brandt et al., 2014), the notion that intolerance derives from opposing world view 
rather than specific right-wing orientated traits. But, as mentioned previously, research should 
seek to validate findings utilising a larger sample with more power, and attitudinally matched 
groups. As this effect is mediated in general by attitudinal strength, attitude extremity may be 
a more accurate predictor to isolate specific neural and cognitive processes involved in the 
intolerance to opposing political material. Future research wishing to further examine any 
variation in the predictors of Intolerance across the left/right divide should utilise where 
possible groups of matched attitudinal strength.  
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the key findings from this study are as follows: i) no neural variation in the 
way left and right wing individuals process inconsistent political material is observed, 
tentatively suggesting there is no difference in how the two groups process material that is 
inconsistent with their political view, ii) attitude extremity rather than attitude orientation may 
be a better predictor of intolerance to further isolate specific neural mechanisms, iii) the left 
insula, dmPFC, STG, and IFG exhibit neural correlates more similar for political material in 
general compared to apolitical material, suggesting more exclusive mechanisms for the 
processing of socio-political information. Together our results provide more basis into not only 
the neural variation between political groups previously not directly measured, but also add 





The neural response to conflict 
Since the previous chapter worked to identify some of the neural principles involved in 
processing politically inconsistent information, the next chapter of my doctoral research aims 
to focus on the fundamental neural principles associated with processing generally conflicting 
information. Conflicting information in this instance involves anything that is incompatible or 
not in keeping with one’s current predisposition, beliefs, or expectations.  
Classic examples demonstrating the general effect conflicting information has on our 
ability to process information come from experiments utilising a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), in 
which the ACC tends to be specifically implicated upon response conflict (when a word colour 
name doesn't match the ink colour) (Barch et al., 2001; Bench et al., 1991; Fan et al., 2002; 
Kerns et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Leung et al., 2000). This subsequently lead to the 
development of a conflict monitoring model (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001). This model postulates the dACC continuously analyses current information for possible 
response conflict arising from interference between separate processing streams. The model 
then proposes a cognitive control system comes into play once conflict is detected, routed in 
the dlPFC, by biasing information processing mechanisms in relevant posterior brain regions.  
fMRI studies also demonstrate using social conformity tasks that the pMFC (ACC and 
dmPFC particularly) tracks the conflict ensued by the difference between an individual's versus 
wider group's opinion, and the subsequent shift of opinion towards the wider group (Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & 
Fernández, 2009; Wu et al., 2016). Interestingly, using the Multi-Source Interference Task (a 
Stroop-like task where participants must quickly identify particular cues whilst systematic 
interference takes place via several additional cues) (MSIT; Bush & Shin, 2006), Izuma and 
Adolph (2013) also demonstrate a region within the pMFC, the pre supplementary motor area 
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(pre SMA) was specifically active for general response conflict, but wasn't for socially 
desirable versus undesirable outcomes, which was associated with the dmPFC (a more anterior 
region of the pMFC). This indicates the social conflict of desirable outcomes and reality may 
elicit distinct neural responses.   
Further examples of more socially pertinent paradigms include fMRI investigations into 
moral conflicts, assessing the neural correlates when faced with acting for self versus collective 
interest. Here it’s found the ACC, prefrontal cortex, parietal lobe, and temporoparietal junction 
are more active when faced with morally conflicting trials (Emonds, Declerck, Boone, 
Vandervliet, & Parizel, 2012), and Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen, (2004) found 
increased activity in the ACC and dlPFC for difficult compared to easy moral conflicts. 
As can be inferred from the above, in the instance of social conformity participants tend 
to resolve conflict (i.e., difference between one's and group's opinions) by changing their 
behaviour (i.e. shifting opinions or preference to that of the wider group). What remains unclear 
still are the more specific mechanisms in the pMFC regarding the processing of social conflict. 
Primarily, if the pMFC is involved in processing conflict alone (conflict detection), or also the 
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A fundamental function of the brain is learning via new information. Studies 
investigating the neural basis of information-based learning processes indicate an important 
role played by the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) in representing conflict between an 
individual's expectation and new information. However, specific function of the pMFC in this 
process remains relatively indistinct. Particularly, it’s unclear whether the pMFC plays a role 
in the detection of conflict of incoming information, or the update of their belief after new 
information is provided. In an fMRI scanner, twenty-eight Japanese students viewed scenarios 
depicting various pro-social/anti-social behaviours. Participants rated how likely Japanese and 
South Korean students would perform each behaviour, followed by feedback of the actual 
likelihood. They were then asked to rerate the scenarios after the fMRI session. Participants 
updated their second estimates based on feedback, with estimate changes more pronounced for 
favourable feedback (when the interaction between scenario type and feedback paints the 
individual in a more favourable light i.e. higher likelihood of pro-social behaviour than 
expected) despite nationality, indicating participants were willing to view other people 
favourably. The fMRI results demonstrated activity in a part of the pMFC, the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), was correlated with social conflict (difference between participant's 
estimate and actual likelihood), but not the corresponding belief update. Importantly, activity 
in a different part within the dmPFC was more sensitive to unfavourable trials compared to 
favourable trials. These results indicate sensitivity in the pMFC (at least within the dmPFC) 
relates to conflict between desirable outcomes versus reality, as opposed to the associated 
update of belief.  
 





Procuring knowledge via new information is one of the most important functions of the 
brain. We update our beliefs, knowledge and/or attitudes based on semantic factual information 
(e.g., how likely you are to become ill) as well as what other people think (i.e., social 
conformity). A number of past neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural mechanisms 
behind information-based learning processes, and currently available evidence converge to 
indicate an important role played by the posterior part of the medial frontal cortex (pMFC), 
particularly the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC), in representing the conflict between an individual's expectation and new information.  
The pMFC is known to play a key role in processing reward prediction error (i.e., the 
difference between actual and predicted reward) in reinforcement learning tasks (specifically 
the ACC) (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015), and a number of neuroimaging studies have indicated 
that the pMFC plays a wider role, being involved in information-based learning in a variety of 
both social and non-social settings where there is no reward. For example, using a social 
conformity task, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study Klucharev, Hytönen, 
Rijpkema, Smidts, and Fernández (2009) demonstrated that the rostral cingulate zone, a part 
of the ACC, tracked the discrepancy between individual's versus group's opinion so that the 
larger the conflict between one's and group's opinions, the higher the activity. This result has 
been replicated by other fMRI studies (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 
2013; Wu et al., 2016). Similarly, a number of electroencephalography (EEG) studies on social 
conformity (Chen et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2012; Schnuerch et al., 2014; 
Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2015; Shestakova et al., 2012) observed electrophysiological responses 
over the pMFC that track the conflict between one's versus group's opinion. The 
electrophysiological responses resemble the feedback-related negativity (FRN) signal, which 
is related to reward prediction error and is considered to be generated in the ACC (Holroyd & 
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Coles, 2002; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). Furthermore, more recently, Pine et al., (2018) 
demonstrated that the dmPFC, is involved in prediction error in learning based on semantic 
factual information.  
Izuma and Adolphs (2013) further demonstrated that the pMFC doesn't  simply represent 
the conflict between one's and others' opinion, but rather, it represents the conflict posed from 
desired versus undesired outcome (Izuma, 2013). Izuma and Adolphs (2013) first replicated 
Klucharev et al.'s (2009) findings showing the pMFC (specifically the dmPFC) tracked the 
conflict between participant's and their fellow students' (participant's “liked” group) opinions. 
However, this pattern was completely reversed if it was an opinion of a “disliked” group; the 
pMFC activity was higher when their opinion was more similar to sex offenders' (disliked 
group) opinion. Thus, the results suggest the pMFC doesn't solely represent the distance 
between one's and others' opinion, but more embodies the divergence from desirable outcomes.  
Although a number of studies have demonstrated that pMFC activity reflects the 
discrepancy between an individual's expectation (or opinion) and new information (or more 
broadly, the discrepancy between a desirable or ideal outcome, and reality), the exact roles of 
the pMFC in information-based learning still remains to be fully elucidated. More specifically, 
it remains unclear whether the pMFC plays a specific role in the detection of conflict of 
incoming information (with the dACC particularly involved in conflict monitoring and 
successive cognitive control; Mansouri et al., 2017; Shenhav et al., 2013), or is associated with 
the update of their belief after new information is provided. In previous studies, these two 
processes often co-occurred- making it difficult to disentangle them. For example, in a typical 
social conformity study, the larger the conflict between one's versus group's opinions, the more 
an individual conforms to the group's opinion (i.e., the greater update of their opinion).  
Accordingly, the current study aimed to shed a new light on the role of the pMFC by 
utilising cognitive bias, extending the findings of Izuma and Adolphs (2013). Numerous studies 
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in psychology have demonstrated that we don't process information objectively, rather how we 
process new information is heavily affected by various cognitive biases. For example, as a 
general rule we tend to seek and formulate our attitudes based on information that already 
aligns with our own ideals, a phenomenon known as confirmation bias (Knobloch-Westerwick 
et al., 2015; Lord et al., 1979; Sunstein et al., 2016). Thus, how we update our belief depends 
on whether new information is consistent with how an individual already sees the world. 
Appropriately, by utilising a cognitive bias, we can dissociate the level of conflict from the 
level of belief updating (e.g., the same degree of conflict can predict different levels of belief 
updating dependent on whether it is consistent with their pre-existing ideals).  
Confirmation bias here was elicited using an intergroup paradigm, specifically Japanese 
participants perceptions of other Japanese individuals (in-group) versus South Korean 
individuals (out-group), whom historically have a tense relationship (see Izuma et al., 2019; 
Lee, 1985). The vast social body of research regarding intergroup relations informs us that 
general favouritism towards the in-group and derogation towards an out-group tends to be a 
common nature of human group behaviour (for example Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 2010). Extensions 
to neuroscience research have been made increasingly apparent (for a recent review see 
Molenberghs & Louis, 2018; Hackel et al., 2017). A recent example comes from Lin et al., 
(2018), who found that after participants rated emotional stimuli in the scanner, they were more 
likely to change their evaluations to be more similar to the evaluations other in-group members 
made compared to the out-group. This shift was tracked by neural activity in the ventral 
striatum, dmPFC, mPFC, posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), temporal pole, amygdala 
and insula (see also Huang et al. 2019). Thus, we applied an intergroup context to promote 
confirmation bias, directly manipulating the level of bias participants are presented with. 
In the study, Japanese university students viewed a series of scenarios which describe 
either a pro-social or anti-social behaviour inside an MRI scanner. Their task was to estimate 
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how typical Japanese and South Korean students answered a series of questions relating to how 
they would respond in said scenarios (Figure 1). After they gave their rating, participants were 
presented with the rating given by Japanese or South Korean students (i.e., what percentage of 
Japanese or South Korean students were willing to perform the pro- or anti-social behaviour). 
After participants had gone through all scenarios and feedback, they were then asked to rerate 
the scenarios as an experimental task outside of the scanner to index the level of belief updating. 
Behaviourally, we expected that how much individuals updated their belief about 
Japanese and South Korean students depends on their attitudes toward Japan and South Korea, 
respectively, and the pro-social nature of the feedback presented. To the extent that our 
Japanese participants have positive attitudes toward Japan, they would update their belief about 
Japanese students more if new information allows them to see other Japanese students more 
favourably (e.g., if more Japanese students were willing to perform a pro-social behaviour than 
expected). We expected a similar pattern for the South Korea condition, but this favourability 
bias would be less pronounced because of participants' less positive attitudes toward South 
Korea (out-group) compared to Japan (in-group) (i.e., participants’ would be more willing to 
view in-group members favourably compared to out-group members).  
Furthermore, the study aimed to test the two competing hypotheses regarding pMFC 
activity, specifically the dmPFC. First, if the dmPFC encodes the conflict between a desirable 
state versus reality, its activity should be more sensitive to the difference between one's 
estimate and actual feedback when the feedback is in an unfavourable direction (conflict 
hypothesis). In contrast, if the pMFC plays a role in belief updating, its activity should be more 
sensitive to the difference when the feedback is in a favourable direction where we expect a 







Twenty-nine right-handed Japanese students with no psychiatric history were recruited 
via a participant pool at the Kochi University of Technology. One participant was excluded 
from the analysis due to excessive head motion (i.e., >3mm). The final sample consists of 28 
participants (male = 16, female = 12; mean age = 20.3). Note that due to a technical fault with 
the scanner, for one subject, fMRI data after 6 minutes of the first session were not obtained. 
Accordingly, for the first session of this subject, the fMRI data analysis included 144 images 
(it should have been 214 images). In this session, the subject still continued the task without 
being scanned for approximately 3 minutes so that our behavioural data analysis included all 
trials. All participants gave written informed consent for participation, and ethics approval for 
the study was granted by the Kochi University of Technology Ethics Board. 
 
Procedure & Task 
Participants were told they would view a series of scenarios which describe either a pro-
social or anti-social behaviour (e.g. “Japanese students from University F were presented with 
the scenario of seeing racist material towards South Korean people on social media, and asked 
if they condoned this”, for full list of scenarios used see Supplementary Materials, Appendix 
2) inside an fMRI scanner, and it was their task to estimate how typical Japanese and South 
Korean students answered a series of questions relating to how they would respond in said 
scenarios. They were asked to rate on a scale of 0%-100% in increments of 5 using a button 
box with three buttons. They used the index finger to increase the rating by 5%, the middle 
finger to reduce it by 5%, and the ring finger to give a final decision. All participants used their 
right hand to give responses. After they gave their rating, participants were presented with the 
“actual” rating given by Japanese or South Korean students, hereby referred to as feedback (see 
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Figure 4.1 for visual of a complete trial). Although participants were led to believe that the 
feedback was real, in reality it was determined by a simple algorithm. Participants were 
exposed to 4 types of scenarios (2 [pro- versus anti- social] × 2 [Japan versus South Korea]), 
with a feedback trial that was higher or lower than the participant’s first estimate. Our 
algorithm, computed via Matlab, ensured that feedback created roughly equal numbers of 
conditions across sessions, with a possible difference between participants' first ratings and 
feedback ranging from 5 to 30. The fMRI session consisted of a total of four runs, each 
consisting of 28 experimental trials plus 1 catch trial (where we presented feedback that 
coincided with participant’s first estimates). Participants were presented with the initial 
scenario for 3 seconds, with no limit when providing their ratings on how likely the group in 
question would partake in such scenario. Subjects response was highlighted for 1 second before 
feedback was presented for 2 seconds.  
A total of 56 scenarios (plus 4 catch trials) were used in the fMRI experiment, and these 
scenarios were selected by a pilot study with an independent sample of n = 17 (mean age = 
20.2, 9 males) from the Kochi University of Technology. In the pilot study, participants were 
asked to rate how likely a group of Japanese and South Korean students would respond to a 
total of 112 (56 Japanese and 56 South Korean) scenarios, as well as rate how positive/negative 
(valence rating) and relevant each scenario was on a scale of 1-7. Scenarios that presented 
extreme (ratings that fell outside of the bottom 7% and top 90%) ratings (how likely the target 
group in question responded) were discarded so as to reduce the effect of participants inevitably 
providing less extreme ratings in a subsequent second rating task, known as the regression-to-
the-mean effect (RTM) which continually illustrates when repeated measures designs are used 
extreme values at the first measurement tend to approach the mean at the succeeding 
measurement (Galton, 1886; Yu & Chen., 2015). Scenarios were additionally matched for 
valence and relevance. This data was also used to generate extra scenarios that resembled and 
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replicated the general theme of accepted scenarios, yielding a total of 28 positive Japanese 
scenarios, 28 negative Japanese scenarios, 28 positive South Korean scenarios, and 28 negative 
South Korean scenarios. Note that participants view the same positive scenarios for both the 
Japan and South Korea conditions, likewise for negative scenarios (i.e., “Japanese students 
from University F were presented with the scenario of seeing racist material towards South 
Korea…” versus “South Korean students from University C were presented with the scenario 
of seeing racist material towards Japan…” - the only aspect manipulated is the nationality of 
the students depicted in the scenario).  
After the main fMRI session, participants were asked to re-rate all 112 scenarios they 
viewed in the scanner. This was to assess the effect of learning or update. In addition, they 
rated each of the 56 scenarios using a 7-point scale on how socially desirable the behaviour 
depicted in each scenario was, excluding any nationality information (that of previous students 
completing the task and also the person depicted in the scenario) (1 = extremely socially 
undesirable, 4 = neither socially desirable nor undesirable, 7 = extremely socially desirable).  
To assess their implicit attitudes toward Japan and South Korea, participants were asked 
to complete an Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The 
IAT included eight positive (e.g., Joy, Love, Wonderful) and eight negative words (e.g., 
Agony, Terrible, Nasty), all words were translated into Japanese. The Japan category included 
typical Japanese names (e.g., Shima, Nakata, Ono) whilst the South Korean category included 
typical Korean names (e.g., Han, Kim, Myong). All Japanese and South Korean names were 
matched on word length. Finally, their explicit attitudes toward Japan and South Korea were 
measured using a semantic differential scale. Participants rated Japan and South Korea on six 
bipolar dimensions using a 7-point scale; ugly-beautiful, bad-good, unpleasant-pleasant, 
honest-dishonest, foolish-wise, awful-nice and unfavourable-favourable. Finally, after 
completing a demographics questionnaire, to help ensure our experimental stimuli was 
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efficient, participants were asked if they doubted anything during the experiment. They were 
debriefed, thanked and paid 2,000 yen for their participation.  
Figure 4.1. (A) Example of a complete South Korean trial (scenario, question/first rating, 
feedback) utilised for fMRI stimuli, as seen by participants inside the scanner. Each trial started 
with a scenario presentation  (description of a pro- or anti-social behaviour) for 3 seconds, after 






(Japanese vs. South Korean student) rated they would partake in said behaviour (in which they 
had no time limit). After, the estimate was highlighted in yellow for 1 second followed by 
feedback presentation (the “true value”) for 2 seconds. (B). Visual representation of Absolute 
Gap and Update scores. (C). Example of 4 scenario types depicted via a pro-social scenario. 
Feedback was reversed in order to create the same conditions for anti-social scenarios.   
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
All fMRI data was acquired using a Siemens 3.0 Tesla Verio scanner with a 32 channel 
phased array head coil. For functional imaging, interleaved T2*- weighted gradient-echo echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequences were used to produce 40 contiguous 3mm thick trans-axial 
slices covering nearly the entire cerebrum (repetition time [TR] = 2,500ms; echo time [TE] = 
25ms; flip angle [FA] = 90°; field of view [FOV] = 192 mm; 64 × 64 matrix; voxel dimensions 
= 3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0mm). A high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted image (1 mm isotropic 
resolution) was also acquired for each participant. 
 
fMRI Data Pre-processing 
The fMRI data was analysed using SPM12 (Welcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience) implemented in Matlab (Math Works). Before data processing and statistical 
analysis, we discarded the first four volumes to allow for T1 equilibration. Head motion was 
corrected using the realignment program of SPM12. Following realignment, the volumes were 
normalised to MNI space using a transformation matrix obtained from the normalisation of the 
first EPI image of each individual participant to the EPI template using an affine transformation 
(resliced to a voxel size of 2.0 × 2.0 × 2.0mm). The normalised fMRI data were spatially 
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half-maximum).  
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
We used two general linear models (GLM) to analyse the fMRI data; one GLM was 
intended to identify brain regions correlated with the absolute differences between participant's 
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estimate and feedback (hereby referred to as: Absolute Gap, see Figure 4.1B), and the other 
GLM was to explore brain regions correlated with the behavioural Update (difference between 
the first estimate and the second estimate, see Figure 4.1B).  
We used a parametric modulation analysis to investigate the relationship between trial-
by-trial Absolute Gap scores and regional brain activity. We analysed the fMRI data based on 
a 2 (Japan or South Korea) × 2 (favourable or unfavourable) design, yielding the four 
following conditions: 1) Japan-Favourable, 2) Japan-Unfavourable, 3) South Korea-
Favourable, and 4) South Korea-Unfavourable, and data was first divided into four sets 
accordingly. The factor of favourable-unfavourable refers to the interaction between the 
valence of presented scenarios (positive or negative) and the feedback given in relation to 
participants first estimates (if this was better or worse than participants initial expectations), 
and whether this combination comes across as overall pro-social or anti-social. For example, a 
favourable trial would be depicted by higher feedback in a positive scenario (i.e., Japanese or 
South Korean students are more willing to act pro-socially than participants expected) or lower 
feedback in a negative scenario (i.e., Japanese or South Korean students are less willing to act 
anti-socially than participants expected). Accordingly, the first model included: 1) each trial 
presentation (duration  = total time from onset of initial scenario presentation to onset of 
feedback presentation), 2) Feedback presentation in Japanese favourable trials (duration = 2 
sec), 3) Feedback presentation in Japanese favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap, 4) 
Feedback presentation in Japanese unfavourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 5) Feedback 
presentation in Japanese unfavourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap, 6) Feedback 
presentation in South Korean favourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 7) Feedback presentation in 
South Korean favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap, 8) Feedback presentation in South 
Korean unfavourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 9) Feedback presentation in South Korean 
unfavourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap, 10) Catch trial presentation (regressor of no 
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interest) (duration = total time of catch trial from initial scenario presentation onset to the end 
of feedback presentation). This analysis yielded the four main contrast images (all conditions 
modulated by Absolute Gap) used for second level analysis. Other regressors that were of no 
interest, such as six motion parameters, the session effect, and high-pass filtering (128 sec) 
were also included.  
The second GLM is similar to the first except we used the behavioural Update (the 
difference between the first vs. second estimates) as opposed to Absolute Gap (the difference 
between the first estimate vs. feedback) as a parametric regressor. Because the simple 
difference between the two estimates is susceptible to the RTM effect (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; 
Yu & Chen, 2015), in order to remove the change between the first vs. second estimates which 
can be explained by the RTM effect, we first ran a linear regression analysis within each 
participant to estimate the RTM effect for each participant. The regression model used all 112 
trials and included participant’s first estimates as the only predictor variable, and Update as the 
dependent variable. All participants showed a negative beta value for first estimates (e.g., the 
higher the first estimate, the more likely participants decrease their estimate on the second 
rating task), and at group level, it was significantly negative (t(27) = -11.92, p < 0.001), 
indicating the existence of the RTM effect. Within each participant, for each trial, we computed 
the Update scores predicted by the RTM effect and subtracted it from the actual Update scores 
(actual Update scores - Update scores predicted by the RTM effect). We then used the new 
controlled Update scores as parametric modulators in the second GLM. The same set up was 
utilised yielding the same contrast images to be used for second level analysis. For all fMRI 
analysis, a whole-brain statistical threshold was set at p < 0.001 voxel wise (uncorrected) and 
cluster p < 0.05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons).  
In addition to these two main GLMs, we also ran three additional GLMs (see 
Supplementary Materials, Appendix 2, for the full details and results of these GLMs); one 
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addressed the effect of the "general favourability" of feedback (i.e. if feedback indicated more 
people are willing to engage in a socially desirable behaviour or less people are willing to 
engage in an anti-social behaviour, regardless of participant’s expectations). The second GLM 
incorporated both Absolute Gap and Update in a single GLM, and the third incorporated 
Update and Favourability in a single GLM to assess the interaction of Update x Favourability 
on brain activity. 
 
Behavioural Data Analysis 
For the IAT, a score for each participant was calculated using the D-score algorithm 
developed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Positive IAT D-scores indicate more 
positive implicit evaluation of Japan relative to South Korea. Semantic differential scores for 
each participant were computed by averaging the six bipolar scales separately for Japan and 
South Korea.  
To calculate the effect of feedback on the extent participants updated their second 
estimates, two multiple regressions (one for Japanese trials, and one for South Korean trials) 
were run to analyse behavioural data. Both included predictor variables: 1) First Estimates, 2) 
Gap (feedback - first estimate, not absolute value), 3) Favourability (dummy coded as 
favourable = 1 and unfavourable = 0), and 4) Gap × Favourability. All predictors were centred 
by subtracting the mean value from each score to evade multicollinearity. The dependent 
variable was Update (second estimate – first estimate).  
We additionally ran a similar analysis to assess the effect of “general favourability” of 
trials as mentioned above (see Supplementary Materials for the full details and results of this 
analysis).   
Due to our stimuli incorporating scenarios that do versus don’t involve the in-group in 
some form (i.e. “… If you saw racist material towards Japanese people on social media, would 
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you feel positive about it? ”, versus, “… Do you believe it is acceptable that when intoxicated 
at a party people sometimes vandalise property? ”), we conducted analysis to compare any 
potential confounds from this. We divided the data into scenarios that did involve the in-group 
(n=15), and scenarios that didn't (n=13). The same analysis as described above for both 





Attitudes towards Japan versus South Korea 
We first found that, not surprisingly, Japanese participants' explicit evaluations of Japan 
were significantly more positive than those of South Korea: (t(27) = 7.95, p < 0.001, Cohen’s 
d = 1.97) (Figure 4.2A). We further demonstrate that explicit evaluations of Japan are 
significantly positive (by examining how different the mean score was from the midpoint of 
the scale: [t(27) = 11.55, p < 0.001]), and that those of South Korean were significantly negative 
(t(27) = -2.11, p = 0.04). Additionally, IAT scores were significantly positive (t(27) = 4.14, p 
< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.80) (Figure 4.2B), indicating more positive implicit evaluations of 
Japan relative to South Korea. No significant correlation was observed for implicit evaluations 
and explicit evaluations (Japanese minus South Korean mean scores) (r = 0.10, p = 0.62), and 
no significant correlation was observed for explicit evaluations between Japan versus South 






Figure 4.2. (A) Bars represent mean explicit evaluations (semantic differentials). Higher 
numbers indicate more positive evaluation. (B) Bar represents mean IAT D-score. Positive 
scores indicate more positive implicit evaluation of Japan relative to South Korea. Circles 
denote individual data points. 
 
Effect of Gap on Update  
Our multiple regression analyses utilising Update as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant effect of Gap (feedback - first estimate) for Japanese (t(27) =  10.97  p < 0.001) and 
for South Korean trials (t(27) =  11.0  p < 0.001), meaning that participants updated their scores 
more from the first to the second rating the larger the gap was between their first rating and the 
feedback they were presented with. The effect of Favourability was not significant for both 
Japan and South Korea trials (Table 4.1). However, we observed a significant interaction effect 
of Gap and Favourability (whether the interaction between the scenario and feedback is overall 
Favourable or Unfavourable) for Japanese trials (t(27) = 3.25, p = 0.003) meaning that 
participants updated their scores significantly more in response to favourable feedback 
compared to unfavourable feedback. The same interaction effect for the South Korea condition 
was in the same direction, but didn't reach significance (t(27)= 1.54, p = 0.13). There was no 
significant difference in the Gap × Favourability interaction effect between the Japanese and 
South Korean conditions (p = 0.30). Accordingly, although our results showed significantly 
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more positive implicit and explicit evaluations of Japan compared to South Korea (Figure 4.2, 
also see Table 4.1), contrary to our prediction, the level of favourability bias is no different 
between in-group and out-group. Thus, our behavioural results showed that participants tended 
to update their scores more if the feedback allows them to see other people (regardless of 
nationality) more favourably. Of final note, it should be stated that no significant difference at 
group level was observed for any of the Japanese and South Korean predictors (First Estimate 
p = 0.23; Gap p = 0.68; Favourability p = 0.43; see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1. Behavioural regression model statistics demonstrating beta and p values for 
all predictor variable.  
Predictor 
Variable 






Japanese      
First Estimate   -7.40 3.84  <0.001** 
Gap    7.45 3.60  <0.001** 
Favourability    0.67 1.81  0.060 
Gap × Favourability    2.06 3.36  0.003** 
South Korean      
First Estimate   -8.11 3.72   <0.001** 
Gap    7.17 3.45   <0.001** 
Favourability    0.28 1.86   0.043* 
Gap × Favourability    1.35 4.62   0.134 
All values are based on a multiple regression analysis within each participant. P values are 
based on group level one-sample t-tests. Japanese mean R2 = 0.46, Japanese mean Adjusted 
R2 = 0.42. South Korean mean R2 = 0.44, South Korean mean Adjusted R2 = 0.40. * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01 
 
Correlation of Explicit Attitudes and Favourability Bias Index 
Although we didn't observe a significant difference in favourability bias between the in-
group and out-group, we observe significant across-subject correlations between explicit 
evaluations and favourability bias for both Japan (r = 0.33, p = 0.04) and South Korea (r = 
0.53, p = 0.002), respectively (Figure 4.3). These results are, at least partially, consistent with 
our prediction and indicate that the strength of favourability bias depends on individuals' 
attitudes toward a group; the higher the explicit evaluation of Japan or South Korea, the more 
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participants updated their belief about members of each group when the feedback is in a 
favourable direction compared to an unfavourable direction.   
The Japanese vs. South Korean favourability bias indices were significantly correlated 
with each other (r = 0.61, p < 0.001), while as stated above, the corresponding explicit 
evaluations were not significantly correlated with each other (r = 0.16, p = 0.41), indicating 
that there exists individual differences in viewing other people favourably in general. 
Thus, our behavioural results indicate that participants update their ratings more when 
feedback is in a favourable direction as opposed to an unfavourable direction, and this effect 
is seemly consistent across nationalities (Table 4.1). Nonetheless, individual differences in the 
tendency to update ratings in a favourable direction compared to an unfavourable direction 
(i.e., favourability bias) were correlated with participants' explicit evaluations for each of the 
Japan and South Korea conditions (Figure 4.3). 
Finally of note, to further examine any bias elicited by participants first estimates, we ran 
a within-subject correlational analysis to check if participants' first estimates are correlated 
with Absolute Gap. But, we found no significant correlation for both Japanese (p = 0.32) or 





Figure 4.3.  Scatter plot demonstrating positive correlation between participants’ explicit 
evaluations of Japan (A) and South Korea (B), and favourability bias (i.e. the extent 
participants update their beliefs in favourable trials compared to unfavourable trials). Shaded 
areas represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
fMRI Results 
Imaging results depicting the effect of Gap  
In order to first broadly depict regions related to the conflict between one’s initial rating 
in relation to feedback, we used Absolute Gap (absolute value) as a parametric modulator. We 
investigated the effect of Absolute Gap regardless of condition (i.e., by combining all of the 
four conditions [Japanese-Favourable, Japanese-Unfavourable, South Korean-Favourable, and 
South Korean-Unfavourable]). Here, we found that pMFC (specifically the dmPFC and left 
supplementary motor area; SMA), lateral superior temporal gyrus (STG), and posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) activity is positively correlated with Absolute Gap (see Table 4.2 & 
Figure 4.4A, B, & C). These regions are largely consistent with areas previously implicated in 
social conflict (the difference between one's and others' opinions) in a social conformity 
paradigm (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Klucharev et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2016). For full 
information of the overlap between the current studies activation map and that of Izuma and 
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Adolph (2013), see Supplementary Results (Appendix 2). In our main ROI of the dmPFC (x = 
-8, y = 24, z = 66), the effect of Gap was significantly positive in all conditions excluding 
Japanese Favourable, which was marginally insignificant (Japanese Favourable p = 0.08, all 
remaining ps < 0.001; Figure 4.4C).  
Furthermore, examination of brain regions negatively correlated with Absolute Gap 
revealed significant activation within the ventral striatum (specifically nucleus accumbens, see 
both Table 4.2 for full list of regions activated and Figure 4.5A & B for associated contrast 
image), also consistent with previous studies. For results of regions correlated with Absolute 
Gap for each condition separately (Japanese-Favourable, Japanese-Unfavourable, South 




Table 4.2. Brain regions correlated with Absolute Gap  
BA, Brodmann area. Statistics are based on a set threshold of height p < 0.001 (uncorrected), 
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE). Areas in grey italics represent significant peak (FWE) sub-
clusters/different regions within larger clusters. 
 
Location BA MNI coordinate  Cluster 
size   x y z Z 
Areas positively correlated with Absolute Gap       
dmPFC 8 -8 24 66 5.16 1996 
     left supplementary motor area (SMA)  8 -6 22 58 5.12  
     left superior frontal gyrus (SFG) 9 -12 46 46 4.87  
Right superior temporal gyrus (STG) 20 44 16 -36 4.84 327 
Left superior temporal gyrus (STG) 30 -42 20 -30 5.07 1569 
     left pars orbitalis gyrus 47 -44 32 -6 4.89  
     left insula 47 -40 22 -8 4.87  
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 23 -6 -50 28 4.80 1076 
Areas negatively correlated with Absolute Gap       
Right postcentral gyrus 
 
40 56 -40 50 6.18 2321 
     right supramarginal gyrus 40 46 -36 40 5.60  
     right angular gyrus 40 40 -48 54 5.07  
Left postcentral gyrus 40 -48 -36 44 5.82 2431 
     left angular gyrus 40 -54 -40 54 5.79  
Right middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 
 
8 26 16 56 5.98 557 
Left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 
 
46 -38 34 26 5.55 931 
Right ventral striatum 25 12 10 -10 5.42 1051 
     right pars opercularis gyrus 44 52 12 24 4.98  




Figure 4.4. (A) Sagittal slice (x = -5) demonstrating brain regions positively correlated with 
Absolute Gap. (B) Coronal slice (y = 14) demonstrating brain regions positively correlated 
with Absolute Gap. (C) Bars represent average beta values across all conditions within key 
significant cluster in the dmPFC, error bars denote SEM. All betas were extracted via a 4mm 
sphere from the peak activation identified by the contrast image depicting all trials modulated 
by Absolute Gap.  
 
Interestingly, exploration of the contrast image depicting activation for Unfavourable 
trials modulated by Absolute Gap compared to Favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap 
(Unfavourable > Favourable) also revealed that a different cluster within the dmPFC (x = 6, y 
= 38, z = 48, k = 238), left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, x = -48, y = 18, z = 22, k = 1137) and 
right middle frontal gyrus (MFG, x =  40, = 8, z = 58, k = 607) was more sensitive to Absolute 
Gap in an Unfavourable direction compared to a Favourable direction (see Figure 4.6A & B). 
As shown in Figure 4.6C, the dmPFC tracked Absolute Gap in an Unfavourable direction, 
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while it was insensitive to Absolute Gap in a Favourable direction. In contrast, no clusters 
survived the threshold in place when examining brain regions correlated with Absolute Gap 
for Favourable trials compared to Unfavourable trials (for full list of results, see Supplementary 






























Figure 4.5. (A) Coronal slice (y = 12) demonstrating brain regions negatively correlated with 
Absolute Gap. (B) Sagittal slice (x = 8) demonstrating brain regions negatively correlated 
with Absolute Gap. (C) Bars represent average beta values across all conditions within key 
significant cluster in the ventral striatum. All betas were extracted via a 4mm sphere from the 
peak activation identified by the contrast image depicting all trials modulated by Absolute 
Gap, and error bars denote SEM.  
 
We additionally explored several brain-behaviour correlations. Although our behavioural 
results revealed robust individual differences in favourability bias, there was no significant 
correlation between the behavioural favourability bias and neural favourability bias (i.e., 
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Unfavourable-Absolute Gap vs. Favourable-Absolute Gap) in the dmPFC (or any additional 
ROIs reported in Table 4.2) for both the Japan (r  = 0.21, p = 0.29) and South Korea (r  = -
0.00, p = 0.98) conditions.  
Thus, while our behavioural data showed that participants' updated their estimates more 
when the feedback was in a favourable direction, our fMRI data actually indicated that the 
cluster within the dmPFC (x = 6, y = 38, z = 48; Figure 4.6A) was more sensitive to the 
discrepancy between one's initial estimate and the feedback when the feedback was in an 
































Figure 4.6. (A) Sagittal slice (x = 7) demonstrating brain regions correlated with Absolute 
Gap (all of the four conditions combined; shown in orange), as well as brain activity for 
unfavourable compared to favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap (shown in green). 
This contrast partially replicates Figure 4.4A (activation shown in orange) from a slightly 
different slice perspective in order to demonstrate the independent nature of the dmPFC 
sensitivity specifically for unfavourable trials (green) compared to across all trials (orange). 
(B) Coronal slice (y = 35) demonstrating brain regions correlated with Absolute Gap (all of 
the four conditions combined; shown in orange), as well as brain regions significantly more 
strongly correlated with Absolute Gap in unfavourable trials compared to favourable trials 
(shown in green). (C) Bars represent average beta values across all conditions within key 
significant cluster in the dmPFC (x = 6 y = 38 z = 48). All betas were extracted via a 4mm 
sphere from the peak activation identified by the contrast image depicting unfavourable 
compared to favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap. All error bars denote SEM. 
 
Imaging Results depicting the effect of Update 
In order to further assess whether any brain regions are related to the actual change of 
participant’s ratings (Update), the same parametric modulation analysis was conducted using 
 
 80 
Update (controlled for RTM) as the parametric modulator, instead of Absolute Gap. No 
significant clusters survived the threshold, and although alluded to in some previous research 
regarding the pMFC and attitude change, no significant activation in these regions were 
observed via the same contrast image combining all conditions modulated by Update.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of the study was to test two competing hypotheses regarding pMFC activity, 
those being; if the pMFC encodes the conflict between reality and a desirable outcome, or if 
the pMFC plays a role in belief updating. This was assessed by employing a cognitive bias to 
specifically disentangle the level of conflict from the level of belief updating, whilst assessing 
pMFC sensitivity respectively. Accordingly, our behavioural data indicates participants' are 
more likely to update their beliefs in the direction of favourable new information (especially 
in the Japan condition), whilst our fMRI data indicates that the dmPFC is more sensitive to 
unfavourable new information (Figure 4.6A), and this effect was consistent across Japanese 
and South Korean conditions. In contrast, no brain region was significantly related to 
behavioural update. Thus, the findings support the conflict hypothesis rather than the update 
hypothesis, indicative that sensitivity in the pMFC (at least within the dmPFC; Figure 4.6A) is 
related to the conflict between ideal scenarios versus reality. 
Activation of the dmPFC in Izuma and Adolph (2013) tracked the discrepancy between 
one’s own preference and its social ideal as defined by balance theory (Heider, 1946). In the 
current study we see a matching activation map to that of Izuma and Adolph (2013) across all 
combined conditions modulated by Absolute Gap (basically the degree of conflict in each trial, 
hereby referred to as such for the purpose of the discussion) (Figure 4.4). However, the same 
neural activation in regards to solely the updating of beliefs based on new information was not 
observed. Henceforth, it would seem likely that brain activity demonstrated in the current 
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experiment is liable representative of the conflict of information presented, rather than any 
associated updating of beliefs. Nonetheless, it should be specified that the analysis is based on 
the onset of feedback presentation, not when participants give their second estimates, where 
any additional neural mechanisms (potentially the dmPFC) related to the update of belief may 
be more apparent. Although we focused on brain activations during the feedback processing in 
the first rating task just like a majority of previous social conformity studies, this might explain 
why under the current paradigm, no significant neural activity regarding the updating of beliefs 
was seen. It is interesting and important to see in future research whether the dmPFC, or other 
brain regions, tracks the degree of behavioural adjustments (update) similar to the ones 
implemented in the current study during the second rating task. 
A key result from this study was that the dmPFC, left IFG, and right MFC were more 
sensitive to the degree of conflict in unfavourable compared to favourable trials. This tallies 
with Holroyd and Cole (2002), who highlight the pMFC’s involvement with the focus on 
consequence predication in terms of action monitoring, specifically, when the outcome of a 
given task is worse than expected. An effect also relevant to this paradigm is the “False 
Consensus Effect” (Ross et al., 1977), the notion that people tend to believe more people share 
their attitudes/world view than actually do. Interestingly, Welborn and Lieberman (2018) found 
when examining the neural effects of consensus bias, pMFC (specifically the medial prefrontal 
cortex and ventral medial prefrontal cortex: mPFC, vmPFC) activity was positively associated 
with observed consensus bias only when information given to participants as feedback (similar 
to this study) was of a challenging/disconfirmatory nature, as opposed to confirming previous 
beliefs. Thus, our work appears to replicate a specific sensitivity of goal-driven conflict within 
the pMFC, also fitting nicely with a recent review regarding the motivational characteristics of 
cognitive consistency, that being we strive more for specifically favoured outcomes rather than 
consistent ones alone (Kruglanski et al., 2018). 
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Although the present study demonstrated that these regions were more sensitive to 
unfavourable information, it was favourable information that was more successfully updated 
in the second rating task. The contrast between our fMRI and behavioural data on the surface 
resembles the general effect of cognitive dissonance (discomfort evoked by the discrepancy 
between attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour) (Festinger, 1962), a form of conflict in its simplest 
form. That being, participants seemingly exhibit more negative emotion from the unfavourable 
feedback (indicated by increased sensitivity in the aforementioned ROIs), yet do not update it 
as efficiently. This allies with previous research which also posits the pMFC (Harmon-Jones 
et al., 2008) as being a central neural correlate of cognitive dissonance, particularly in the 
dmPFC (Izuma et al., 2010) and dACC (Izuma et al., 2010; Van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma & 
Murayama, in press). However, it should be said that in more typical examples of cognitive 
dissonance, participants often resolve this by amending behaviour and/or attitudes accordingly, 
whereas in the current study participants seem to resolve this conflict by not (or to a lesser 
extent) updating their belief according to unfavourable information (further discussion on the 
lack of memory update is extended in the next paragraph). One important distinction to first 
make here is that participants’ also have an additional conflict of being “correct”, since there 
is a factually correct answer in this experimental paradigm, whereas classic cognitive 
dissonance studies tend to revolve around preference (which participants can freely change). 
This avoids any extra level of divergence the current participants’ may have underwent 
(resolving dissonance vs. being correct), which could possibly have added to the lack of update 
observed in the current experiment. 
Relatedly, and in somewhat contrast to the current study, Hughes et al., (2017) found 
participants were more likely to update their impressions regarding negative information 
during an impression formation task about out-group members, but not in-group members. This 
was associated with less engagement in the dACC, temporoparietal junction, insula, and 
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precuneus when processing negative information about the in-group, but importantly not the 
out-group. The asymmetry of participants impression update and neural response between in 
versus out-group members suggests that these neural structures are important for updating 
one’s impression, especially when new information fits with individual's pre-existing notions 
(e.g., in-group positive behaviour and out-group negative behaviour). Though this study is 
similar in many ways to the current experiment, there are several key differences. First relates 
to the point above regarding the re-assessment of subjective (opinion) versus objective (facts) 
information, which is an important distinction between Hughes et al., and the current study. 
Second, it should also be noted that though we do measure subjective impressions (explicit 
attitudes) of the out-group (and in-group) as they do in Hughes et al., (2007), because this was 
only measured at a single timepoint in the current experiment, it isn’t possible to compare any 
possible update/change of this after participants received feedback. Finally, it’s also relevant 
to highlight that the participants who produced lower explicit attitudes towards the out-group 
did tend to update more unfavourable information, allying with Hughes et al., (2017) findings.   
In order to continue to elucidate the role of the dmPFC, it is increasingly important to 
assess the effect of memory. In an apparent contrast to our results, previous research would 
suggest that more conflicting or shocking information is more likely to be remembered 
(Berntsen, 2002; Kensinger, 2007). This might suggest that unfavourable information was not 
updated due to participants' active inhibition of the effect of unfavourable information on 
update during the second estimation task. Alternatively (but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive), what may be apparent is inefficient encoding of the feedback during the first 
estimation task. Our data demonstrates that activity in the left IFG, and the dmPFC was more 
sensitive to Gap in unfavourable trials compared to favourable trials (Figure 4.6), and these 
two regions have been implicated in response inhibition (Floden & Stuss, 2006; Verfaellie & 
Heilman, 1987). Historically, increased activation in the right (as opposed to the left) IFG has 
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been associated with increased inhibitory control of responses (e.g. De Zubicaray et al., 2000; 
Garavan et al., 1999; Konishi et al., 1999), but there is some suggestion that the left IFG also 
plays a central role in response inhibition. Specifically, Swick et al., (2008) found patients with 
left IFG legions had higher error rates than controls in both conditions (easy vs. hard) of a 
Go/NoGo task, being further impaired in the hard condition when more inhibitory control was 
required. Future research should examine more extensively neural activities during the second 
rating task and the relationship regarding the valence of social information and subsequent 
memory processes (e.g., whether unfavourable feedback is better remembered) to tease apart 
the two possibilities (increased inhibition vs. decreased encoding).   
Further ROIs we found from the fMRI data include areas of the striatum (nucleus 
accumbens specifically) which were negatively correlated with the degree of conflict in each 
trial (Figure 4.5). This supplements previous research that also demonstrates when participants’ 
opinions differ from that of others, whilst the pMFC is activated, the striatum is deactivated 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Klucharev et al., 2009). Welborn 
and Lieberman (2018) infer their similar finding in terms of the gratifying value of information. 
This seems a tenable explanation, with additional links made toward reinforcement learning 
surrounding conformity by Klucharev et al., (2009). Alternativly, it seems an important 
distinction that our dmPFC (Figure 4.4) and ventral striatum clusters encode Absolute Gap 
across all trials (positively: dmPFC, or negatively: ventral striatum) in a relatively objective 
manner (i.e., unaffected by favourability of information), suggesting these regions are related 
to general learning mechanisms. On the other hand, the dmPFC cluster that encodes Absolute 
Gap specifically for Unfavourable compared to Favourable trials (Figure 4.6) seems to be 
influenced by a top down emotional process so that in addition to the objective difference 
(Absolute Gap), the activity is modulated by what participants hope the reality to be. Thus, our 
ventral striatum activation may represent the processing of information more objectively 
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(rather than subjectively being influenced by the valuation of information). This relates nicely 
to a recent fMRI study by Pine et al., (2018), which specifically highlights the ventral 
striatum’s involvement in the learning of factual knowledge.  
Our results also demonstrate increased sensitivity for the degree of conflict within the 
PCC and lateral STG. The PCC has been implicated in tracking the cognitive imbalance 
between own preferences versus others, as well as being correlated with subsequent preference 
changes in Izuma and Adolph (2013). Furthermore, work by Falk et al., (2014) show the PCC 
is more sensitive to social exclusion in participants who also subsequently change their actions 
to suit peers (in this case, increase the level of risk in their driving more around peers as 
opposed to alone). Although our data doesn’t demonstrate an association with the behavioural 
update, it seems consistent that this region plays a role in the recognition of social conflict. Not 
only has this been established in terms of social conflict (see also Seehausen et al., 2014), 
neuroimaging studies have also shown the PCC to be sensitive in monitoring non-social 
prediction errors and conflict in general (Christoffels, Formisano, & Schiller, 2007; Kadosh, 
Kadosh, Henik, & Linden, 2008). The STG has some similar implications in the monitoring of 
social conflict (Christoffels et al., 2007). For example, Premkumar et al., (2012) report the right 
STG to be more active during the viewing of social rejection as opposed to neutral scenes, and 
Seehausen et al., (2014) found the STG to be more active in an empathy-experiment where 
participnats felt misunderstood (in comparison to understood)- both implicating a potential role 
in the discrimination of desirable versus undesirable outcomes.  
Behaviourally, participants demonstrated a favourability bias in general. We display a 
correlation between positive evaluations to Japan or South Korea and the extent participants 
update their beliefs based on more favourable information. More broadly put, participants 
increasingly revise their belief based on new information to see people more positive for 
previously more liked social groups, supplementing the previously discussed work of Izuma 
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and Adolph (2013). As participants overall possessed positive explicit evaluations of Japan, 
the data coincides with our behavioural hypothesis that more beliefs are updated regarding 
favourable information. However, although our participants explicit and implicit evaluations 
were on average significantly less positive for South Korea, participants did still elicit a 
favourability bias at the group level for South Korea also, updating their beliefs more so for 
favourable trials here too.  
Our initial behavioural hypothesis stated that any favourability effect would be less 
pronounced for South Korea owing to less positive attitudes in general. This outcome was 
forecast to arise due to the effect of confirmation bias, seeing participants update information 
that more aligns with their previous attitudes (more positive towards Japan versus less positive 
towards South Korea). An initial consideration here, then, is that the results are more consistent 
with the “good-news-bad-news-effect” (Eil & Rao, 2011). This is the concept that information 
and its corresponding valence are not updated and processed in an equal, linear manner. 
Positive information (good news) tends to revise according to previous experience and is more 
efficiently updated, whereas the updating of negative information (bad news) is not, being more 
noisy and less likely to be updated into current beliefs. Broadly applied to the current findings, 
this would suggest that updating favourable compared to unfavourable information takes place 
in a more efficient and uniform manner, regardless of any pre-existing views and thus the social 
group applied to. This has been supported by work on optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2011), 
demonstrating participants’ are more likely to update their belief based on more positive 
information about the future compared to negative information. This positivity bias is theorised 
to arise as a protection for general mental well-being (Garrett et al., 2018; Sharot et al., 2011).  
It should also be noticed that the explicit evaluations towards South Korea displayed 
large across-participant variability, with many participants having close-to-neutral attitudes 
(meaning they didn't feel particularly positive or negative towards South Korea). But to 
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reiterate, the participants who did have extremely negative explicit evaluation’s towards South 
Korea did tend to update their beliefs more in response to unfavourable feedback. Speculatively, 
since we only measured explicit attitudes at a single time point, these results might suggest that 
more moderate attitudes are increasingly amendable upon receiving information, more easily 
disconfirming any pre-existing weaker stereotypes. This, in comparison to more extreme 
attitudes in which the information may be updated more asymmetrically (as presented by 
Sunstein et al., 2016), further facilitating attitude polarisation, additionally coincides with 
research that demonstrates increased dogmatic-intolerance in relation to attitude extremity (van 
Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017).  
Future research may wish to select a more exclusively hostile and defined in/out-group 
paradigm in order to further extract any additional effects of attitude extremity, and the 
associated neural correlates/behavioural update. For example, it may be interesting to examine 
a potential ceiling (or cross-over) effect of the good-news-bad-news model in terms of extreme 
attitudes- at what point is bad news about a disliked out-group no longer perceived as “bad”, 
but instead information that only affirms ones previous distain? What’s more, if the pMFC is 
sensitive to social conflict as we showed, this should in theory then be less robust for negative 
information regarding disliked out-groups for people with extremely negative attitudes due to 
lesser conflict between ones social outlook versus reality. Finally, although we found similar 
neural correlates of Absolute Gap (Figures 4.4 & 4.5) between the present study with Japanese 
participants and our previous study with American participants (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013), it is 
important to systematically and directly test cultural differences in social information 
processing in future research, as previous studies indicate cultural differences in social 
conformity (Bond & Smith, 1996; Korn et al., 2014) and cognitive dissonance (Kitayama, 





In sum, the current experiment demonstrated two key points, i) activity in the dmPFC 
was representative of socially conflicting information, specifically the conflict between ideal 
outcomes versus less ideal realities, and not the corresponding belief update based on new 
information. ii) participants updated their beliefs based on more favourable information, of 
which related to more positive evaluations of the social group in question. Future research 
should aim to further disentangle the role of the dmPFC in social conflict processing, 
attempting to apply experimental paradigms to specifically isolate potentially independent 
neural correlates related to the actual update of participants beliefs based on new information 
received. What can be taken from the current study overall is an increased understanding of the 
role played by the dmPFC in social information processing, of which ultimately helps us to 
understand how decisions about social interactions are made, providing a more solid 








Specialised Social Mechanisms 
 
 Chapters two, three, and four of the current thesis are centred around the various neural 
mechanisms underlying the processing of inconsistent and conflicting social information. The 
final empirical chapter will relate to the premise of a specialised network for the processing of 
social information.  
A network of brain regions specifically adapt to process social information and underlie 
social cognition, coined the ‘social brain’, originally comes from Brothers (1990). It 
predominantly encompasses the amygdala, orbital frontal cortex and temporal cortex as its key 
components. This network is heavily involved in governing social cognition (Apperly, 2010; 
Saxe, 2010), emotion (Reeck, Ames, & Ochsner, 2016), and behaviour (Montague & Lohrenz, 
2007; for a recent review see Ugazio & Ruff, 2017). Several evolutionary accounts offer 
conceptual support to this notion, for example Dunbar's (1998) Social Brain Hypothesis. This 
is the idea that as social group size increased in our evolutionary history, interactions became 
more complex and required more sophisticated levels of social networking in order to thrive. 
This is demonstrated across primates by observing the positive relationship between social 
group size and brain size (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007a, 2007b), and also a potential limit to group 
size dependant on the sophistication of information processing across organisms (Dávid-
Barrett & Dunbar, 2013).  
Research has shown distinct neural activation for social versus non-social mechanisms, 
for example Martin and Weisberg (2003) found when participants viewed geometric 
animations that purposefully conveyed social interaction (relative to conveying mechanical 
interaction) it elicited activation in  regions of the posterior temporal cortex, previously 
associated with identifying human faces (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; but see also 
Duchaine & Yovel, 2015). Yet, it remains not yet clarified whether the brain has a specific 
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neural circuit for exclusively social interactions, or if this network is a product of information 
processing that can also be relevant to non-social information. In terms of decision making, 
Ruff and Fehr (2014) proposed two schematic processes for dealing with social versus non-
social stimuli, the first being the “extended common currency schema” which argues similar 
neural processes assign motivational relevance to social/non-social information, suggesting a 
similar network of brain function that encode social versus non-social information. Secondly, 
the “social valuation specific schema” assumes a devoted neural network which specifically 
encode values accompanying interactions and decisions that involve others.  
In order to investigate the parallels between social and non-social information 
processing, it seems important to isolate a factor that can be viewed as both social and non-
social. One example of this is the emotion of reward. This can be in terms of material gain (i.e. 
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Although managing social information and decision making on the basis of reward is 
critical for survival, it remains uncertain whether differing reward type is processed in a 
uniform manner. Previously, we demonstrated that monetary reward and the social reward of 
good reputation activated the same striatal regions including the caudate nucleus and putamen. 
However, it remains unclear whether overlapping activations reflect activities of the same 
neuronal population or two overlapping but functionally independent neuronal populations. 
Here, we re-analysed the original data and addressed this question using multivariate pattern 
analysis (MVPA) and found evidence that in the left caudate nucleus and bilateral nucleus 
accumbens, social versus monetary reward were represented similarly. The findings suggest 
that social and monetary rewards are processed by the same population of neurons within these 
regions of the striatum. Additional findings also demonstrated similar neural patterns when 
participants experience high social reward compared to viewing others receiving low social 
reward (potentially inducing schadenfreude). This is possibly an early indication that the same 
population of neurons may be responsible for processing two different types of social reward 
(good reputation and schadenfreude). These findings provide a supplementary perspective to 
previous research, helping to further elucidate the mechanisms behind social versus non-social 
reward processing.   
 








Consider this; i) people think you are wonderful and regard you as a great person, ii) You 
win a £100 prize in a raffle. Both feel good, but it remains uncertain whether social reward and 
non-social tangible reward share the same neural mechanisms. Making important decisions 
that dictate survival based on both social and non-social information is a part of everyday life, 
yet we know relatively little about the comparative reward types that we seek on a daily basis.  
An abundance of neuroscience studies has found various social and non-social rewards 
activate the striatum (Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Izuma, 2015). It is well established in non-human 
neurophysiological studies that striatal neurons respond to reward (Schultz, Tremblay, & 
Hollerman, 2000), and this basic finding has been later replicated by human neuroimaging 
studies (Delgado, 2007). More recently, social neuroscience and neuroeconomics studies 
demonstrated that the striatum is activated by a variety of socially rewarding stimuli or 
behaviour, such as mutually cooperating with other individuals (Rilling et al., 2002; Rilling, 
Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004), punishing unfair behaviour (De Quervain et al., 
2004; Singer et al., 2006), giving charitable donations (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; 
Moll et al., 2006) and receiving a good reputation from others (Izuma et al., 2008; Korn, Prehn, 
Park, Walter, & Heekeren, 2012).   
An important question, which remains unanswered in the field, is whether social and 
non-social rewards share a common neural mechanism. Importantly, activation overlaps 
between social and non-social rewards reported previously (Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Izuma, 
2015) cannot be taken as strong evidence for a shared neural mechanism. It may indeed reflect 
the same population of neurons responding to both types of rewards (i.e., a shared neural 
mechanism) or it could in fact signify largely distinct populations of neurons specialised for 
each reward, which are located in close proximity within the same brain region (e.g., striatum). 
Ruff and Fehr (2014) proposed two schematic processes for dealing with social versus non-
 
 94 
social stimuli. The first being the “extended common currency schema”, which argues identical 
neural processes assign motivational relevance to social/non-social information, predicting 
similar populations of neurons that encode reward values of both social and non-social stimuli. 
Secondly, the “social valuation specific schema” assumes an evolved and dedicated neural 
circuitry which specifically encode reward values associated with interactions and decisions 
that involve others. This predicts that there are distinct populations of neurons that process 
social and non-social rewards.  
In the present study, we aim to provide an insight into this question by applying 
multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006) to the data 
reported previously (Izuma et al., 2008). In the original study (Izuma et al., 2008), the same 
participants were asked to perform tasks involving non-social reward (money) and social 
reward (good reputation from others), and found that the striatum (see Figure 6.1; especially 
the left putamen and left caudate nucleus) were significantly activated for both monetary and 
social rewards. Using MVPA, the present study further investigates whether the pattern of 
activity across multiple voxels within the striatum is similar between social and monetary 
rewards (i.e., that social and monetary rewards share common neural networks). 
 How to interpret activation overlaps has been a recurring question in cognitive 
neuroscience, and MVPA is a useful tool that allows us to infer activities of underlying 
neuronal populations from fMRI signals, helping us interpret the overlaps (Kaplan, Man, & 
Greening, 2015; Peelen & Downing, 2007). For example, Woo et al., (2014) found physical 
pain and social pain, previously known to activate the same regions within the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC) and insula (Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011), actually 
showed distinct activation patterns under MVPA, providing important evidence against a 
popular notion that physical and social pain share the same neural representation (Eisenberger, 
2012). Similarly, using MVPA, Krishnan et al., (2016) found that felt and seen pain, also 
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known to activate the same dACC region (Singer et al., 2004), in fact demonstrate distinct 
activation patterns. Thus, as these overlaps that were once thought to indicate a similar neural 
mechanism under conventional univariate analysis are actually found to be discriminate under 
MVPA, it seems fundamental that fMRI research utilise this technique to further assess whether 
underlying neuronal populations are similar.  
   
MATERIALS and METHODS 
Participants 
Data from 19 participants (9 male; mean age = 21.6 ± 1.5 years) were included in the 
reanalysis using the existing dataset (Izuma et al., 2008). All participants gave written informed 
consent for participation, and the study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the National 
Institute for Physiological Sciences, Japan. 
Procedure 
Full details for procedures used in the study have been published previously (Izuma et 
al., 2008). Briefly, each participant completed two different fMRI experiments (involving 
monetary and social rewards, respectively) on two separate days.  
In the first monetary reward experiment, participants took part in a simple gambling task. 
In each trial, they were asked to choose one of three cards and were given 0, 30, or 60 yen 
depending upon the card chosen. However, the amount that they could earn in each block of 
eight trials was predetermined; thus, the monetary reward each participant received during each 
block was systematically manipulated. There were three reward levels (i.e., conditions); 1) 
High, 2) Low, and 3) No reward (control). After the monetary reward experiment, participants 
were asked to respond to several personality questionnaires and to introduce themselves in 
front of a video camera. Participants were specifically told that others would evaluate them 
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based on their responses to these questionnaires and the video-taped self-introduction, and that 
they would be shown the results in the next fMRI experiment.  
In the second social reward experiment, the same 19 participants were presented with a 
picture of themselves and a word or phrase indicating the impression of them formed by others. 
In reality, the items presented were predetermined, such that all participants had the same social 
reward experience. By systematically grouping six items (into one block) based on desirability 
ratings provided by another group of participants (n = 33), the level of social reward 
experienced by participants in each block was also manipulated. To exclude the possibility that 
seeing a positive word per se might be rewarding, as was suggested by a previous study 
(Hamann & Mao, 2002), the impressions of other people were also presented. Thus, there were 
six conditions in the second experiment (a 2 [Target; Self or Others] × 3 [Reward level; High, 
Low or No reward] within-subject design). 
 
Data Analysis 
fMRI data was re-analysed using SPM8 as implemented in Matlab 8.1. Head motion was 
corrected using the realignment program, and the volumes were normalised to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space using the EPI template (resampled voxel size 2 × 2 × 2mm). 
Spatial smoothing was not applied in order to preserve fine grained activation patterns for 
multivariate analyses. 
Correlation-based MVPA: As done in the original correlation-based MVPA study 
(Haxby et al., 2001), the data for each participant was split into odd versus even runs. This is 
mainly intended to check the within-condition correlation as well as to get an insight into 
whether the same population of neurons process social and monetary rewards. For example, if 
a striatal region processes information related to monetary or social reward, the same condition 
(e.g., High Monetary Reward condition) should evoke similar activation patterns across 
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different runs (i.e., significant within-condition correlation). Similarly, if the same population 
of neurons encode social and monetary rewards, the two conditions should evoke similar 
activations patterns (i.e., significant between-condition correlation). It should be noted that 
using the average absolute values of the difference in each realignment parameter between one 
scan and its successive scan as a motion index (e.g., Yoo, Choi, Juh, Pae, & Lee, 2005 
Neuroscience Research), we confirmed that there was no significant difference in head motion 
(in each of the six motion parameters) between odd vs. even runs in both monetary and social 
experiments (all ps > 0.103). 
Since each of the monetary and social reward experiments had four fMRI runs, we 
conducted the same first level analysis using a general linear model as our original study (Izuma 
et al., 2008), and contrast images were generated separately for odd and even runs, yielding a 
total of 18 contrast images for each participant; 6 contrast images from the monetary reward 
experiment (2 [fMRI Run; odd or even] × 3 [Reward level; High, Low or No reward], and 12 
contrast images from the social reward experiment 2 [fMRI Run; odd or even] × 2 [Target; Self 
or Others] × 3 [Reward level; High, Low or No reward]). These 18 contrast images were used 
in the correlation-based MVPA.  
Using the data from each of the four regions of interest (ROIs; see below), correlation-
based MVPA computes a voxel-by-voxel correlation between one condition in odd runs and 
the same (within-condition correlation) or different (between-condition correlation) conditions 
in even runs within each participant. The resulting correlation values are fisher-z transformed 
and submitted to group level analyses (i.e., one-sample t test [one-tailed]).  
Classifier-based MVPA: To check the robustness of our results (especially in the left 
caudate nucleus), we also ran classifier-based MVPA (a linear support vector machine), which 
was performed by using custom-made Matlab scripts in combination with LIBSVM 
(http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/). For this analysis, contrast images for each of the 
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four fMRI runs were created separately, and classification performances were evaluated by a 
leave-one-run-out cross-validation procedure. We first trained and tested a classifier that 
discriminates the High Monetary Reward condition from the No Monetary Reward condition 
(i.e., monetary reward classifier). Similarly, we next trained and tested a classifier that 
discriminates the High Social Reward-Self condition from the No Social Reward-Self 
condition (i.e., social reward classifier). Finally, we tested whether the monetary reward 
classifier can discriminate the High Social Reward-Self condition from the No Social Reward-
Self condition, and similarly whether the social reward classifier can discriminate the High 
Monetary Reward condition from the No Monetary Reward condition, an approach known as 
Multivariate Cross-Classification (MVCC; Kaplan et al., 2015).  
Regions of Interest (ROI): Striatal areas commonly activated by both monetary and social 
rewards, which were reported in the original study (Izuma et al., 2008), included the caudate 
nucleus and putamen bilaterally. Thus, in order to limit each MVPA to the same anatomical 
region, we applied anatomical masks (the WFU PickAtlas toolbox for SPM; Maldjian, 
Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) to the original activation map and created four ROIs (see 
Figure 1); 1) right caudate nucleus (125 voxels), 2) left caudate nucleus (87 voxels), 3) right 









Figure 6.1. Axial slice (y = 14) showing the four ROIs used in the MVPA. These four 
regions were commonly activated during social vs. monetary rewards in the original study 
(Izuma et al., 2008). 
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Exploratory Searchlight Analysis: In addition to the ROI based MVPA mentioned above, 
we conducted a searchlight MVPA to explore whether any other regions within the striatum 
represent social and monetary rewards in a similar manner. We applied a striatum mask 
(caudate nucleus and putamen taken from the AAL masks implemented in the WFU pickatlas 
toolbox; Maldjian et al., 2003) and performed the correlation-based MVPA within each 
searchlight with a radius of 3 voxels (maximum of 123 voxels, and less at the boundaries of 
the striatum). To claim that a striatal region processes values of social and monetary rewards 
in a similar manner, within each searchlight, we computed the three following voxel-by-voxel 
correlations; 1) High Monetary Reward within-condition correlation (i.e., odd vs. even runs), 
2) High Social Reward-Self within-condition correlation, and 3) High Monetary Reward vs. 
High Social Reward-Self between-condition correlation (we took the average of two between-
condition correlations). Each correlation was fisher-z transformed and submitted to group level 
analysis (i.e., one-sample t test [one-tailed]). We looked for regions within the striatum where 
all three average fisher-transformed correlations are simultaneously significantly positive at p 
< 0.05 level (note that the probability of finding such results by chance is 0.0125% [i.e., 0.053 
= 0.000125]) with an extent threshold of 50 contiguous voxels.  
 
RESULTS 
Correlation- and classifier-based MVPA in the left putamen and left caudate nucleus ROIs 
Since the original univariate GLM analysis identified common activations especially in 
the left putamen and left caudate nucleus (Izuma et al., 2008), we first focused on these two 
regions.  First, we confirmed the reliability of activation patterns in the two main conditions 
(High Monetary Reward condition and High Social Reward-Self condition). Each of the two 
conditions showed a significant within-condition correlation in both the left putamen (both ps 
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< 0.007, Figure 6.2A) and left caudate nucleus (both ps < 0.010; Figure 6.2B), indicating that 
each of these two conditions consistently evoked similar activation patterns across odd and 
even runs within each of the two ROIs. Interestingly, the average correlation between High 
Monetary Reward and High Social Reward-Self conditions was significantly positive in the 
left caudate nucleus (average r = 0.069, t(18) = 2.23, p = 0.019; Figure 6.2B), while it was not 
significant in the left putamen (p = 0.43). To check whether the significant between-condition 
correlation found in the left caudate nucleus ROI was not due to outliers, we further computed 
the same correlations after removing outliers (0.23% of the data) based on a Grubbs' test 
(Grubbs, 1950). The average correlation between High Monetary Reward and High Social 
Reward-Self conditions was slightly attenuated after removing outliers (average r = 0.064), but 
remained significant (t(18) = 2.05, p = 0.028). 
Figure 6.2. Correlation-based MVPA results in the left putamen (A) and left caudate nucleus 
(B). MHR: High Monetary Reward, SlfHR: High Social Reward-Self. Error bars denote 
Standard Error of Mean (SEM).  
 
To check the robustness of the findings in the left caudate nucleus ROI, we further 
conducted a classifier-based MVPA to test whether a monetary reward classifier can classify 
social reward and vice versa. The result first showed that the monetary reward classifier could 
distinguish High Monetary Reward vs. No Monetary Reward conditions significantly above 



















































B: Left Caudate Nucleus
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the social reward-self classifier could distinguish High Social Reward-Self and No Social 
Reward-Self conditions significantly above the chance level (average performance = 56.6%, 
t(18) = 2.04, p = 0.028). Importantly, each classifier was generalisable to a different reward 
type. The monetary reward classifier could distinguish High Social Reward-Self and No Social 
Reward-Self conditions significantly above the chance level (average performance = 59.9%, 
t(18) = 3.75, p < 0.001). Likewise, the social reward classifier could distinguish High Monetary 
Reward and No Monetary Reward conditions significantly above the chance level (average 
performance = 55.3%, t(18) = 3.02, p = 0.004). Furthermore, weight values of the monetary 
and social reward classifiers were significantly correlated with each other within the left 
caudate nucleus ROI (average r = 0.10, t(18) = 1.94, p = 0.034). This result indicates that each 
voxel within the left caudate nucleus similarly contributed to the classification of monetary and 
social rewards, suggesting shared neural representations between monetary and social rewards 
within this area. 
 
Exploratory correlation-based MVPA in the four ROIs 
We further investigated all possible correlations across nine conditions (3 conditions 
form the monetary reward experiment and 6 conditions form the social reward experiment) in 
the putamen and caudate nucleus in both hemispheres (Figure 6.1) to explore detailed 
representational similarity across all conditions (Figure 6.3A-D). Across all of the four ROIs, 
for each of the Monetary Reward and Social Reward-Self conditions, the average within-
condition correlations were significantly positive (see Figure 6.3E). It should be noted, 
however, that the average correlations between High Monetary Reward and High Social 
Reward-Self were significantly positive only in the left caudate nucleus. 
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Interestingly, we found that the average correlations between High Social Reward-Self 
and Low Social Reward-Other were all significantly positive across the four ROIs (see Figure 
6.3E). As schadenfreude (positive emotion derived from the misfortunate of another 
individual) is also known to activate the striatum (Cikara et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2009), 
these results may suggest an interesting possibility that two different types of social reward 
(good reputation toward the self and schadenfreude) share the same neural representations 



































A: Left Caudate Nucleus
D: Right Putamen  
B: Right Caudate Nucleus
C: Left putamen 
E: The number of times each correlation (cell) was 























































































































































































































































































Figure 6.3. Average Correlation similarity matrix in the left caudate nucleus (A), the right caudate 
nucleus (B), the left putamen (C) and the right putamen (D). Each cell represents the average 
voxel-by-voxel correlation between two conditions across 19 subjects. (E) The number of times 
each average correlation (cell) was significant (based on one-sample t-test) across the four ROIs. 
MHR: High Monetary Reward condition, MLR: Low Monetary Reward condition, MNo: No 
Monetary Reward condition, SlfHR: High Social Reward-Self condition, SlfLR: Low Social 
Reward-Self Condition, SlfNo: No Social Reward-Self condition, OthrHR: High Social Reward-





Exploratory searchlight analysis within the striatum 
The searchlight analysis revealed that only in the bilateral ventral striatum (nucleus 
accumbens; see Figure 6.4) the average correlation between High Monetary Reward and High 
Social Reward-Self conditions as well as two average within-condition correlations (i.e., odd 
vs. even runs in the High Monetary Reward condition and odd vs. even runs in the High Social 
Reward-Self condition) were all significantly positive, suggesting a common neural code for 











Figure 6.4. Axial slice (y = 12) showing the result of the searchlight analysis. Peak 
coordinates; left nucleus accumbens (x = -8, y = 16, z = 0, 55 voxels, average r at the peak = 
0.089) and right nucleus accumbens (x = 8, y = 16, z = -6, 63 voxels, average r at the peak = 
0.109). Colours represent t values based on one-sample t-test testing the strength of the 
correlation between High Monetary Reward and High Social Reward-Self conditions. Note 
that the left nucleus accumbens area slightly overlaps (i.e., 9 voxels) with the left caudate 
ROI (Figure 6.1). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Using the correlation and classifier-based MVPA, the present study extends the original 
study (Izuma et al., 2008) that employed conventional univariate analysis and demonstrated 
that the left caudate nucleus similarly represents social and monetary rewards. Together with 
the original finding (Izuma et al., 2008), the left caudate nucleus showed; 1) linear increase in 
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activation according to reward values of both social and monetary rewards (Izuma et al., 2008), 
2) significant voxel-by-voxel correlation between High Monetary Reward and High Social 
Reward-Self conditions, 3) the Monetary Reward classifier was generalisable to distinguish 
Social Reward vs. No Social Reward (and vice versa), and 4) weight values of Monetary 
Reward and Social Reward classifiers were significantly correlated with each other, indicating 
that there is a common neural code for social and monetary rewards in the human striatum. 
Furthermore, although the left caudate nucleus was the only region that showed a similar 
representation between two types of reward across the four ROIs (Figure 6.1), the searchlight 
analysis revealed that the bilateral nucleus accumbens, one of the brain areas most heavily 
implicated in reward processing (Haber & Knutson, 2010), also represents social and monetary 
rewards in a similar manner. The results suggest that the same population of neurons within 
each of these areas encode both abstract social reward as well as physical tangible reward and 
thus provide support for the “extended common currency schema" (Ruff & Fehr, 2014). 
Although significant, the size of the correlations between social and monetary rewards 
we found in the left caudate ROI and bilateral nucleus accumbens was fairly small (average r 
= 0.069-0.109; Figure 6.2B and Figure 6.4), suggesting that only a small subset of neurons in 
this area encodes both social and monetary rewards. This is largely consistent with previous 
neurophysiological studies. For example, Carelli and Wondolowski (2003) found on a single 
cell level only 8% of neurons in the nucleus accumbens responded to both juice and drug 
rewards in rats, and Robinson and Carelli (2008) found that only 15% of nucleus accumbens 
neurons responded to both juice and ethanol (alcohol) in rats, whereas Bowman, Aigner, and 
Richmond (1996) found no neurons (0%) in the ventral striatum responded to both juice and 
drug rewards in monkeys. More recently, Klein and Platt (2013) presented social images (e.g., 
hindquarters of female monkeys) as reward to monkeys and found that only 6% of striatal 
neurons encoded information about both juice reward and social images. Thus, although largely 
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distinct populations of neurons encode different types of reward, there exists a small population 
of neurons that commonly encode different types of reward in the striatum. The present study 
further suggests that in the human striatum, there may be the same population of neurons that 
encode tangible reward and highly abstract social reward of good reputation formed by other 
people.  
Additionally, it may also be noteworthy that we observed similar populations of neurons 
within the striatum encode information related to receiving high social reward as well as 
viewing others receiving low social reward. One speculation at this point may suggest similar 
neural processes occur for social reward and also for the concept of schadenfreude. This falls 
in line with previous work that reported striatal activation in response to schadenfreude (Cikara 
et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2009) and may suggest a shared neural representation between 
experiences of schadenfreude and good reputation. Schadenfreude in this sense could suggest 
a form of reputation management. As social beings flourishing in groups we always have to 
ensure our place is secure, therefore heightening our own social reputation induces reward, but 
it may also be that having another more “highly ranked” individual’s reputation lowered would 
still give us the rewarding feeling of amplifying our own group status (in relativity). Aside 
from this explanation being speculative at this stage, it should also be noted that for Low Social 
Reward-Other, the result was only significant in two out of four ROIs for the within-condition 
analysis indicating that activation patterns evoked in this condition are not very consistent. 
Thus, future research should aim to further dissect this fascinating relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, though there have been somewhat discrepant results regarding the encoding 
of different types of reward in neuroimaging, our results via MVPA indicate that there exists a 
small population of neurons that commonly encode different types of rewards in the striatum, 
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and the present study further suggests that in the human striatum, there may be the same 
population of neurons that encode tangible reward and highly abstract social reward of good 
reputation formed by other people.  This suggests that the brain processes social versus non-
social information similarly. Additionally, finding similar neural patterns when participants 
experience high social reward compared to viewing others receiving low social reward also 
suggests a potential for similar populations of neurons responsible for processing two different 
types of social reward (good reputation and schadenfreude). These findings provide an 
important perspective to some previous research, and help to further illuminate the mechanisms 






A more comprehensive understanding of the neural basis of social information processing 
The current thesis can be thought as tackling two key objectives, the first to more fully 
understand the precise neural and psychological mechanisms involved in processing 
particularly valent inconsistent social information. This involves the effect social 
attitudes/orientation has and whether any discrepancies reflect separate psychological 
mechanisms used as a result of this, and also the more specific role the pMFC has in the 
detection of social conflict and subsequent behavioural amendments. Secondly, it involves the 
assessment of whether the human brain includes a specified neural network dedicated 
exclusively to processing social information. Overall the work presented aids to uncover more 
fundamental principles involved in the handling and processing of social information. With 
this, future models can further work towards a more complete understanding of the various 
levels involved in understanding and responding to social information, aiding in not only the 
development of scientific understanding, but also paradigms aiming to produce positive 
behavioural change within social contexts.   
 
Summary of main findings 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) aimed to specifically assess whether opposing 
political orientations could predict similar strength and pattern of activation in response to 
politically inconsistent material, allowing subsequent insight into the psychological 
mechanisms regarding political intolerance. Further, this experiment aimed to uncover a more 
precise neural basis regarding the handling of politically inconsistent information. In this 
demonstrates two particularly important findings. The first being that no significant difference 
in univariate activation strength, or multivariate pattern of activation, was seen across 
participants classed as politically left versus right wing. This suggests the underlying 
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psychological mechanisms for processing political inconsistent material may be similar across 
political orientation, supporting the concept that political intolerance can be considered an 
Ideological Conflict (Brandt et al., 2014), though smaller and imbalanced sample size mean 
results can only moderately indicate. The second key finding comes from the notion that 
political information in general (both consistent and inconsistent with participants orientation) 
tended to possess an activation pattern unique to immoral or generally negative material across 
key regions associated with processing socially valent information (specifically the left insula, 
dmPFC, STG, and IFG). Overall results indicate the processing of political material used by 
the study on a basic level involves typical cognitive processes such as comprehension of syntax 
(Walenski et al., 2019) and faces (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000a; Kircher et al., 2000; 
Mitchell et al., 2005) (evidenced by positive correlations of activation pattern across all 
conditions in our ROIs), processing the emotional valence of stimuli (indicated by more similar 
activation pattern of general political, immoral and negative compared to neutral material in 
the dmPFC and STG), and finally evidence that the left insula, dmPFC, STG, and IFG process 
general political material significantly more similar than control, negative, and immoral 
material indicates the presence of at least some political specific processes.  
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) aimed to further dissect the role of the pMFC in 
processing socially conflicting information, clarifying a role in conflict detection or conflict 
resolution (i.e. behavioural update/amendment). Using social information designed to elicit 
cognitive bias, disassociating the level of behavioural update from the level of social conflict 
presented, this paradigm brought three key findings to light. The first was that participants 
tended to update beliefs based on new information about others more if it allowed them to see 
others in a more favourable light, regardless of group membership (i.e. for both in and out 
group members).  Second, a region of the dmPFC tracked the level of conflict across all trials, 
ascertaining the role of this region in conflict detection. Third, a separate region of the dmPFC 
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demonstrated increased activation for unfavourable compared to favourable new information 
about others (again regardless of group membership), demonstrating sensitivity to undesirable 
versus desirable social outcomes. Since favourable information was more strongly associated 
with subsequent behavioural update compared to unfavourable information, this suggests the 
role of the pMFC is more relevant to conflict detection as opposed to conflict resolution.   
The final empirical chapter (Chapter 6) aimed to further uncover the notion of a specialised 
social neural network, dedicated exclusively to the processing and handling of social 
information in humans. By manipulating the extent of monetary and social reward, the neural 
circuitry elicited was directly compared using multivariate analysis techniques designed to 
discriminate the pattern of activation within reward related regions in the brain. In this was 
found positive correlations between the activation patterns of social vs. monetary reward that 
indicate neurons encode both social and monetary reward in the ventral striatum (specifically 
the left caudate nucleus and bilateral nucleus accumbens) similarly, suggesting a common 
neural code for reward in the human striatum. As this was not also found in the left putamen, 
and smaller correlation coefficients of activation pattern suggests only a subset of neurons 
encode both social and non-social reward similarly, further research is needed to establish the 
extent of a common neural code for social as opposed to non-social reward, and ultimately 
social versus non-social processes.  
 
Fundamental principles of social information processing 
One of the key themes to come from the three empirical chapters as outlined above might 
be a notion of non-specificity. Ranging from attitudinal orientation, group membership, to 
social versus non-social, the general consistency of neural responses in associated ROIs is 
apparent in these particular experiments across the paradigms assessed. For example, 
behavioural and neural processes were similar across political orientation in the first empirical 
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chapter, and also in the second across nationality. This indicates that although various 
psychological models may indicate specifically distinct or specialised underlying processes 
(for example accounts of right wing intolerance and motivated social cognition by Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloways, 2003), the way we deal with social information, on a neural level at 
least, may be more generalisable across the specific paradigms assessed than previously 
alluded to. Overall, this perhaps suggests an absence of particular dedicated systems for 
externally manufactured subsets of social information processing. However, due to the 
limitations present in the application of some of these paradigms, for example an imbalance in 
attitude strength between groups in the first and second empirical chapters, this remains 
theoretical until further research can replicate the current findings using more well defined and 
matched social groups.  
The third empirical chapter suggests a common neural code regarding social and non-social 
information amongst subsets of neurons (also echoing a theme of non-specificity), and suggests 
perhaps some principles from general information processing may be applicable to social 
models. This is outlined as a possible angle by Adolphs, (2010), who posits that how the brain 
processes social information may be more computational in nature, being synonymous with 
information input generally. The current knowledge surrounding social neuroscience could 
mean regions, in which particular functional heterogeneity is associated, cannot necessarily be 
applied to exclusively social processes, but instead these regions are simply relevant for social 
information amongst other general processes. Parkinson and Wheatley (2015) nicely discuss 
this concept with their neural account of a repurposed social brain. This is the idea that brain 
regions originally purposed for non-social mechanisms, through years of evolutionary pressure 
to flourish in social interaction and context, are repurposed for specific social cognitions. One 
example given is the ability to redirect our attention amongst appropriate internal processes, 
which can support the ability to locate appropriate knowledge relevant to the social context. 
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Specifically, the authors state one function of the superior parietal lobule (SPL) may have 
initially evolved to switch attention between external cues but over time also became adapt for 
internal switching (Shomstein, 2012), supported by similar patterns of activation (indicating 
shared mechanism) within the SPL for tasks requiring the switching of external and internal 
attention (Knops, Thirion, Hubbard, Michel, & Dehaene, 2009). Thus, it may be that regions 
originally specified for various modules of information processing over time became equally 
specified in social equivalents of information processing. Though this discounts somewhat the 
notion of a dedicated and specified social brain, our social relevance still make social processes 
a forefront of brain function.  
The current thesis sheds particular light on the role of the pMFC, in particular the dmPFC, 
a key region across the first two empirical chapters. In this is demonstrated the dmPFC is 
relevant for the processing of socially inconsistent and conflicting information. What might be 
interesting is that separate regions of the dmPFC may be involved in the objective as opposed 
to subjective processing of information. For example and as touched upon earlier, in the second 
empirical chapter one dmPFC cluster seemed to encode information objectively (the cluster 
active for general conflict across all trial types, see Chapter 4, Figure 4.4) whereas another 
dmPFC cluster seemed to be active for personally valent information, such as unfavourable 
feedback (undesirable outcome) about others (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.6). It may be that within 
the dmPFC are separate regions that relate to different processing modalities, one for the 
objective integration of social information, and one that processes information more 
subjectively, biasing information. Interestingly a study by Kao, Davis, and Gabrieli (2005) 
found when assessing participants predicted versus actual recollection of images of landscapes, 
though neural division could primarily be seen for predicted (vmPFC) versus actual (bilateral 
mid-temporal lobe, left posterior cingulate) outcomes, the dmPFC was linked with both 
predicted and actual encoding success (although only a trend towards significance was 
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observed for the association with actual success). The authors suggest from this the dmPFC 
may relate to both the objective versus subjective valuation of information. Therefore, perhaps 
relevant functional divisions within the dmPFC are those of objective versus subjective 
encoding of information, though this account remains speculative until further research 
examines the dmPFC in this light.  
 
Implications for future work 
An important benefit in understanding the neural and psychological basis of social 
information processing is the ability to aid in positive behavioural change. The more 
understood about the way social information is integrated, further attempts to isolate predictors 
that result in negative as opposed to positive appraisals of information can be made. Linking 
back to work by Parkinson and Wheatley (2015), a pertinent example of this following the 
account of a repurposed social brain might be in their account of instrumental repurposing. In 
the understanding that older, non-socially-specified neural structures are relevant to process 
contemporary (often complex) social information, the nature in which information is presented 
can be manipulated in order to relate to more evolutionary pertinent mechanisms to produce a 
favourable response. Notably, they argue empathic mechanisms were initially associated (and 
so are more adapt/responsive) with small, monocultural social groups, explaining the tendency 
for a proximate, lone individual in trouble to evoke more of an emotional response than the 
knowledge of, distant, mass poverty (Slovic, 2007). Therefore, the implication of this 
knowledge means future research could focus interventions that are designed to promote, for 
example, positive attitude change towards the tolerance of opposing political views in a way 
specific to tap into evolutionary older mechanisms. As a result, perhaps this would involve the 
demonstration of an individual’s affect surrounding political issues (the deep rooted, personal 
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reasons one abides by their political stance), rather than presentations of facts that aim to 
increase tolerance to opposing views.   
Another broad goal for social neuroscience, considering the complexity and number of 
mechanisms involved in processing multifaceted information, might be paradigms designed to 
incorporate higher ecological validity. This is argued to be an essential step by Schilbach et al., 
(2013), who claim that paradigms in both psychology and neuroscience studies can 
unintentionally manufacture effects through the use of third-person-perspective, laboratory 
stimuli. Rather, they argue aspects of real-time second-person interaction are crucial in 
understanding the true nature of social information processing, both psychological and neural 
mechanisms. This is demonstrated in a fMRI experiment that asks participant to imagine being 
in a social interaction with three other people, whilst a virtual character they see in the scanner 
directs either socially relevant or arbitrary facial expressions towards the participant (self-
directed) or the other imagined characters (other-directed). An increase in neural activity in the 
vmPFC and amygdala was seen for self-directed facial expressions, whereas other-directed 
facial expressions were related to varied recruitment of the medial and lateral parietal cortex 
(Schilbach et al., 2006). This at the very least demonstrates a uniqueness in even subtle forms 
of social interaction from a second person social experience. Going forward, this approach 
might map more specific and accurate neural mechanisms involved in social information 
processing, as opposed to examining neural mechanisms relevant from inferring social 
interaction via third person perspectives. Not only does more realistic social interaction account 
for more socially relevant neural correlates, it could also discount other non-relevant processes 
that may be by-products in more conventional fMRI paradigms. Without ecologically valid 
paradigms, knowledge specific to social processes cannot be exclusively inferred. This is 
particularly important if the practical application of knowledge is for positive behavioural 




Overall, the current doctoral thesis adds the following important ideas to the field of social 
neuroscience; firstly, political orientation considered from a left-right ideological standpoint 
does not produce behavioural or neural divergence reflective of previous social accounts that 
predict distinctive underlying psychological mechanisms. This adds indirect neural support to 
the notion psychological mechanisms’ underlying intolerance stem from contradicting 
ideology. Secondly, a key neural structure in the processing of inconsistent socio-
political/social information in particular is the dmPFC, which demonstrates a key role in 
representing conflict, and potentially demonstrates functional subdivisions in the objective 
versus subjective integration of social information. Finally, similar activation patterns between 
social vs. monetary reward suggest there exists at least a subset of neurons that are responsible 
for processing information equivalent across social and non-social domains, indicating the 
neural structures implicated in social information processing may be relevant also across 
general information processing. With this knowledge, future research can continue to 
understand the neural accounts of social information processing with more direction. 
Understanding the processes behind social information processing are essential in the 
development of the field, which lead to more efficient paradigms to produce positive 
behavioural change within social contexts. As history and the preceding few years has shown, 
social conflict via misattribution of social information causes detrimental consequences across 
society, and so a shift in working towards understanding the mechanisms relevant to the 











Appendix 1a: Political Knowledge, Self report knowledge, Interest, and Discussion 
measure 
 
Please indicate whether the following statements are true, false, or you don’t know: 
 
1. Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative Prime Minister;......... 
 
2. The number of MP’s is about 100;......... 
 
3. The longest time allowed between general elections is four years;......... 
 
4. Britain’s electoral system is based on proportional representation;......... 
 
5. MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees;......... 
 
6. Britain has separate elections for the European parliament and the British 
parliament;......... 
 
7. No-one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit;......... 
 
 
Please now circle the relevant answers on the scales provided to the following questions: 
How much, if anything, do you feel you know about ‘Politics’?  
 
How interested would you say you are in “Politics”?  
 





1 2 3 4 
Nothing at all Not very much A fair amount A great deal 
1 2 3 4 
Not at all Interested Not very much Fairley Interested Very Interested 
1 2 3 4 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
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Appendix 1b: Political Intolerance questionnaire 
 
Please read the following statements, and indicate the extent you agree with each one by 
circling the appropriate numbers on the scale below: 
 
 
1. I believe that members of Government should not be allowed to organize in order to 
pass laws demoting (promoting) the freedom of movement for European immigrants.  
 













2. I think that Thatcherite (Corbynite) groups should be allowed to distribute economic 
policy pamphlets and buttons on local university campuses.  
 













3. I think that a group should not be allowed to organize in order to try to decrease 
(increase) the amount of refugees we allow into the country.  
 













4. I believe that a group that opposes (supports) increases in welfare support should not 
be allowed to organize in order to influence government policy on welfare support in 
higher education.  
  













5. I believe that a person who supports (opposes) the privatization of the NHS should 
not be allowed to disrupt an MP’s meeting.   
 


















6. I think that a protestor should be allowed to give a speech entitled “Jeremy Corbyn 
(Nigel Farage), Our Generation’s Hitler”.  
 













7. I think that the Britain First Party (Communist Party of Britain) should not be allowed 
to visit university campuses in order to register potential voters.  
 













8. I think that protestors who approve (disapprove) of introducing more grammar 
schools in the UK should be allowed to demonstrate in city centres.   
 













9. Society shouldn’t have to put up with those who have political ideas that are 
extremely different from the majority.  
 














10. It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they 
can become disruptive. 
 






















11. Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to 
society of extremist political views.  
 














Finally, please indicate on the scales below: 
 
When it comes to economic policy, do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate, or 
conservative? 
 
           1                 2                  3                   4                   5                  6                  7                       
Strongly Liberal                                Moderate                           Strongly Conservative 
 
 
When it comes to social policy, do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate or 
conservative? 
 
           1                 2                  3                   4                   5                  6                  7                       
Strongly Liberal                                Moderate                           Strongly Conservative 
 
 
































































Figure 2.S1. Similarity matrix representing the correlation between all experimental trials in 
















































































































































































































Scenarios that do versus don't involve the other-group 
To examine any effect involving the associated other-group (i.e. Japanese people acting 
pro-social/anti-social towards South Korean people, and vice versa) has on the extent 
participants update information from the first to second estimate, we divided the data into 
scenarios that do involve the other-group (n=15), and scenarios that don't (n=13). The same 
GLM set up as reported in the manuscript for both Japanese and South Korean trials was 
applied within each set of data. Both included predictor variables: 1) First Estimates, 2) Gap 
(feedback - first estimate, not absolute value), 3) Favourability (dummy coded as favourable 
= 1 and unfavourable = 0), and 4) Gap × Favourability. All predictors were centred by 
subtracting the mean value from each score to evade multicollinearity. The dependent 
variable was Update (second estimate – first estimate). 
 
The effect of “General Favourability”: Behavioural Data Analysis 
It may be possible that, in addition to the Gap between participant's first estimate and 
feedback, participants second estimate is influenced by the General Favourability of 
feedback, the extent the majority versus minority partake in positive/negative behaviours, 
regardless of participants expectations. To quantify general favourability of trials, we 
computed our General Favourability score via the following equation:  
If a scenario is positive, General Favourability score = feedback given – 50 
If a scenario is negative, General Favourability score = -1 × (feedback given - 50) 
Accordingly, this general favourability score takes values between -50 to +50, and a higher 
score indicates that more people are willing to engage in a positive (pro-social) behaviour or 
less people are willing to engage in a negative (anti-social) behaviour. 
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We then entered the following predictor variables into a multiple regression analysis, to 
assess the degree to which general favourability effects the extent participants updated their 
second estimates:1) First Estimate 2) General Favourability, 3) Gap (feedback - first estimate, 
not absolute value), and 4) General Favourability × Gap. All predictors were centred by 
subtracting the mean value from each score to evade multicollinearity. The dependent 
variable was Update (second estimate – first estimate). Just like the main regression analyses 
reported in the manuscript, we ran two separate regression analyses (one for Japanese Trials, 
and one for South Korean trials). 
 
The effect of “General Favourability”: fMRI Data Analysis 
We conducted a further GLM on our fMRI data to assess the effect of General 
Favourability, and the Interaction between General Favourability and Absolute Gap on brain 
activity. We again used a parametric modulation analysis with a similar set up to our previous 
analysis to investigate the relationship between trial-by-trial General Favourability scores, 
Absolute Gap scores, the interaction between General Favourability and Absolute Gap 
scores, and regional brain activity.  
Accordingly, the model included: 1) each trial presentation (duration  = total time from 
onset of initial scenario presentation to onset of feedback presentation), 2) Feedback 
presentation in Japanese trials (duration = 2 sec), 3) Feedback presentation in Japanese trials 
modulated by General Favourability (as calculated in the behavioural GLM above), 4) 
Feedback presentation in Japanese trials modulated by Absolute Gap (duration = 2 sec), 5) 
Feedback presentation in Japanese trials modulated by General Favourability × Absolute 
Gap, 6) Feedback presentation in South Korean trials (duration = 2 sec), 7) Feedback 
presentation in South Korean trials modulated by General Favourability, 8) Feedback 
presentation in South Korean trials modulated by Absolute Gap (duration = 2 sec), 9) 
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Feedback presentation in South Korean trials modulated by General Favourability × Absolute 
Gap, 10) Catch trial presentation (regressor of no interest) (duration = total time of catch trial 
from initial scenario presentation onset to the end of feedback presentation). This analysis 
yielded six main contrast images (all Japan and South Korean trials modulated by General 
Favourability, Absolute Gap, and General Favourability × Absolute Gap) used for second 
level analysis. Other regressors that were of no interest, such as six motion parameters, the 
session effect, and high-pass filtering (128 sec) were also included. We again set a whole-
brain statistical threshold at p < 0.001 voxel wise (uncorrected) and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE 
corrected for multiple comparisons). Finally, since we incorporate two parametric modulators 
into our model, we disabled SPMs default implementation of the serial orthogonalization 
procedure.  
 
The Interaction between Absolute Gap and Update on brain activity: fMRI Data Analysis 
We conducted a further GLM on our fMRI data to assess the Interaction between 
Absolute Gap and Update (corrected for the regression-to-the-mean effect: as used in the 
second GLM in the manuscript) on brain activity. We again used a parametric modulation 
analysis with a similar set up to our previous analysis to investigate the relationship between 
trial-by-trial Absolute Gap scores, Update Scores, the interaction between Absolute Gap and 
Update scores, and regional brain activity.  
Accordingly, the model included: 1) each trial presentation (duration  = total time from 
onset of initial scenario presentation to onset of feedback presentation), 2) Feedback 
presentation in Japanese Favourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 3) Feedback presentation in 
Japanese Favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap (duration = 2 sec),  4) Feedback 
presentation in Japanese Favourable trials modulated by Update (duration = 2 sec), 5) 
Feedback presentation in Japanese Favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap × Update, 6) 
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Feedback presentation in Japanese Unfavourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 7) Feedback 
presentation in Japanese Unfavourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap (duration = 2 sec), 
8) Feedback presentation in Japanese Unfavourable trials modulated by Update (duration = 2 
sec), 9) Feedback presentation in Japanese Favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap × 
Update, 10) Feedback presentation in South Korean Favourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 11) 
Feedback presentation in South Korean Favourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap 
(duration = 2 sec), 12) Feedback presentation in South Korean Favourable trials modulated 
by Update (duration = 2 sec), 13) Feedback presentation in South Korean Favourable trials 
modulated by Absolute Gap × Update, 14) Feedback presentation in South Korean 
Unfavourable trials (duration = 2 sec), 15) Feedback presentation in South Korean 
Unfavourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap (duration = 2 sec), 16) Feedback 
presentation in South Korean Unfavourable trials modulated by Update (duration = 2 sec), 
17) Feedback presentation in South Korean Unfavourable trials modulated by Absolute Gap 
× Update, 18) Catch trial presentation (regressor of no interest) (duration = total time of catch 
trial from initial scenario presentation onset to the end of feedback presentation). This 
analysis yielded twelve main contrast images (all of the four conditions modulated by the 
three parametric regressors; Absolute Gap, Update, and Absolute Gap × Update) used for 
second level analysis. Other regressors that were of no interest, such as six motion 
parameters, the session effect, and high-pass filtering (128 sec) were also included. We again 
set a whole-brain statistical threshold at p < 0.001 voxel wise (uncorrected) and cluster p < 
0.05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons). We again disabled SPMs default 
implementation of the serial orthogonalization procedure. 
Finally, due to a technical fault with the scanner, for one subject, fMRI data after 6 
minutes of the first session were not obtained. Accordingly, the fMRI data analysis included 
144 images for the first session (it should have been 214 images). In this session, the subject 
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still continued the task without being scanned for approximately 3 minutes so that our 
behavioural data analysis included all trials. Due to the small number of trials in the condition 
for this particular analysis with an interaction variable, we excluded the first session data for 
this subject (for all other GLMs, the analysis of this subject’s fMRI data included the 144 
images from the first session).  
 
The Interaction between Update and Favourability on brain activity: fMRI Data Analysis 
We conducted a further GLM on our fMRI data to assess the Interaction between 
Update (corrected for the regression-to-the-mean effect: as used in the second GLM in the 
manuscript) and Favourability on brain activity. We again used a parametric modulation 
analysis with a similar set up to our previous analysis to investigate the relationship between 
trial-by-trial Update Scores, Favourability, and the interaction between Update scores and 
Favourability, and regional brain activity.  
Accordingly, the model included: 1) each trial presentation (duration  = total time from 
onset of initial scenario presentation to onset of feedback presentation), 2) Feedback 
presentation in Japanese trials (duration = 2 sec), 3) Feedback presentation in Japanese trials 
modulated by Update (duration = 2 sec),  4) Feedback presentation in Japanese trials 
modulated by Favourability (duration = 2 sec), 5) Feedback presentation in Japanese trials 
modulated by Update × Favourability, 6) Feedback presentation in South Korean trials 
(duration = 2 sec), 7) Feedback presentation in South Korean trials modulated by Update 
(duration = 2 sec), 8) Feedback presentation in South Korean trials modulated by 
Favourability (duration = 2 sec), 9) Feedback presentation in South Korean trials modulated 
by Update × Favourability, 10) Catch trial presentation (regressor of no interest) (duration = 
total time of catch trial from initial scenario presentation onset to the end of feedback 
presentation). This analysis yielded six main contrast images (both Japanese and South 
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Korean conditions modulated by the three parametric regressors; Update, Favourability, and 
Update × Favourability) used for second level analysis. Other regressors that were of no 
interest, such as six motion parameters, the session effect, and high-pass filtering (128 sec) 
were also included. We again set a whole-brain statistical threshold at p < 0.001 voxel wise 
(uncorrected) and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons). We again 
disabled SPMs default implementation of the serial orthogonalization procedure. 
 
Supplementary Results  
The effect of involving the other-group: Behavioural Results   
We see no significant different at the group level for statements that involve vs. don't 
involve the other-group for Gap in Japanese (p= 0.62) or South Korean trials (p= 0.12), First 
estimate in Japanese (p = 0.10) or South Korean trials (p= 0.50), and Favourability for 
Japanese (p= 0.33) or South Korean Trials (p= 0.81). However, though we don't see a 
significant difference for Japanese trials that do or don't involve the other-group for the 
interaction Gap × Favourability (p= 0.83), we do see a significant difference for South 
Korean Trials (t(27)= -2.19, p= 0.04). This demonstrates that participants were more likely to 
update information in response to our Favourability bias significantly more when scenarios 
don’t involve the other-group (but note that p values were not corrected for multiple 
comparisons). Overall, there was no strong difference between the two types of scenarios, 
and the result suggests the general pro-social nature of our scenarios, rather than any action 
towards the other-group specifically, is what primarily drives our effects. 
 
The effect of “General Favourability”: Behavioural Results  
We again found a significant effect of Gap (feedback - first estimate) for Japanese 
(t(27) =  11.10  p < 0.001) and South Korean trials (t(27) =  10.99  p < 0.001), meaning that 
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participants updated their scores more from the first to the second rating the larger the gap 
was between their first rating and the feedback they were presented with. We found a 
significant effect of General Favourability for South Korean trials (t(27) =  3.78  p < 0.001), 
meaning trials that were generally more favourable regardless of participants expectation or 
initial estimate were updated more from participants first to second rating, though we don't 
see this effect for Japanese trials (p = 0.20). We observed a significant interaction effect of 
General Favourability × Gap for Japanese trials (t(27)= 2.35, p = 0.03) meaning that 
participants updated their scores significantly more in response to generally favourable 
feedback when Gap was larger. However, we don't observe the same interaction for South 
Korean trials (p = 0.48).  
To further investigate any variation between Japanese and South Korean trials, 
variation in strength of effect between General Favourability, Gap, and General Favourability 
× Gap, and any interaction present, we conducted a 2 × 3 within-subjects ANOVA 
[Nationality (Japanese Trials vs. South Korean Trials) × Predictor (General Favourability vs. 
Gap vs. General Favourability × Gap)] on the standardised beta values. We found a 
significant main effect for Predictor F(2,54)= 69.43, p < 0.001, but no significant main effect 
for Nationality (p = 0.92). Further, we see a significant interaction between Predictor × 
Nationality F(2,54)= 4.60, p = 0.01. A series of (Bonferroni-Holm) corrected paired t-tests 
demonstrated the effect of General Favourability was significantly stronger for South Korean 
compared to Japanese trials t(27)= -2.73, p = 0.03. Alternatively, the effect of General 
Favourability × Gap was significantly stronger for Japanese compared to South Korean trials 
t(27)= 2.40, p = 0.047. There was no significant difference between Japanese versus South 
Korean trials for Gap (p = 0.20) (see Supplementary Figure 4.S1).  
 
 128 
Supplementary Figure 4.S1. Bars represent average standardised beta values for Japan (red 
shaded) and South Korea (blue shaded). Error bars denote SEM. 
 
Overall, consistent with the results of the original regression model (Table 4.1), this 
highlights the strong effect of Gap. The results of this new regression analyses further suggest 
that participants are only influenced by General Favourability for Japanese trials when this is 
more unexpected (i.e. General Favourability significantly interacts with Gap, but we observe 
no main effect). On the other hand, for South Korean trials participants are more broadly 
influenced by the General Favourability of trials, and the effect of General Favourability was 
not modulated by any prior expectations (i.e. significant main effect of General Favourability, 




The effect of “General Favourability”: fMRI Results 
When broadly depicting regions related to General Favourability across all trials 
regardless of nationality (i.e., Japan and South Korea conditions combined), we didn't find 
any significant cluster for this contrast, and this was also the case for Japanese and South 
Korean trials separately. The regions related to Absolute Gap across trials were similar to our 
initial analysis examining just the modulation of Absolute Gap (see Supplementary Table 
4.S1 for all results), for example a significant cluster in the dmPFC. In assessment of regions 
related to the interaction between General Favourability and Absolute Gap across all trials, 
no voxels passed our threshold. This was also the case for Japanese and South Korean trials 
separately.    
Therefore, we conclude that although the General Favourability of trials has an impact 
on participants behavioural Update (further supporting our conclusion on the favourability 
bias shown with our participants, i.e. the tendency to update information that allows them to 
see others more positive/favourable), it seems this effect has little impact on brain activity as 
measured in the current paradigm, and doesn't significantly interact with our Gap/Absolute 
Gap variable on a behavioural or neural level.  
 
The Interaction between Absolute Gap and Update on brain activity: fMRI Results 
In order to first replicate regions related to the Absolute Gap across all trials regardless 
of nationality or favourability, we find the results are similar to our initial analysis examining 
just the modulation of Absolute Gap (see Table 4.2 in the main manuscript), for example a 
significant cluster in the pMFC. Furthermore, examination of brain regions negatively 
correlated with Absolute Gap again revealed significant activation within the ventral striatum 
(see Supplementary Table 4.S2). To again assess the regions related to the Update of all 
trials, we replicated our initial result and didn't find any significant cluster for this contrast. In 
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assessment of the regions related to the interaction between Absolute Gap and Update across 
all trials, we didn't find any significant activation.  
Therefore, we found the same independent contribution (as the two main fMRI GLMs 
in the manuscript assessing Absolute Gap and Update separately) from the regressors 
combined in this model but failed to see any effect from the Interaction between the two on 
brain activity. 
 
The Interaction between Update and Favourability on brain activity: fMRI Data Analysis 
In order to first view regions related to the Update of trials regardless of nationality 
(i.e., Japan and South Korea conditions combined), we replicated our initial result and didn't 
find any significant cluster for this contrast. This was also the case for Japanese and South 
Korean trials separately. To assess the regions related to Favourability across all trials, we 
show a significant cluster in the left middle frontal gyrus (see Supplementary Table 4.S3). In 
assessment of the interaction between Update and Favourability, we didn't find any 
significant activation. Therefore, from the regressors combined in this model we fail to see 
any effect from the Interaction between Update and Favourability on brain activity. 
 
Overlap in activation with Izuma and Adolphs (2013) 
Although the dmPFC regions sensitive to Absolute Gap (Figure 4.4) in the present 
study are slightly lateralised within the dmPFC compared to Izuma and Adolphs (2013) 
previous study, there was considerable overlap between them (270 voxels). There is also 
overlap in the PCC (263 voxels) and left IFG (269 voxels), suggesting the pattern of whole 
brain activations is similar. We likewise found overlap between the dmPFC region identified 
in Izuma and Adolphs (2013) and the dmPFC region especially sensitive to Absolute Gap for 
Unfavourable trials compared to Favourable trials (Figure 4.6; 108 voxels). This might 
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suggest that the dmPFC is generally sensitive to the difference between one’s rating and the 
reality or group opinion, but activity in a part of the dmPFC (such as the green region 
depicted in Figure 4.6) is modulated by what an individual hopes the reality or group opinion 





Supplementary Table 4.S1. Brain regions correlated with Absolute Gap, General 
favourability, and General Favourability x Absolute Gap 
BA, Brodmann area. Statistics are based on a set threshold of height p < 0.001 (uncorrected), 
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE). Areas in grey italics represent significant peak (FWE) sub-
clusters/different regions within larger clusters. 
  
Location BA MNI coordinate  Cluster 
size   x y z Z 
Areas positively correlated with Absolute Gap       
dmPFC 8 -8 26 60 5.53 2225 
Left superior temporal gyrus (STG)  22 -54 -36 2 5.74 2510 
     left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)  47 -44    32 -10 5.70  
Right medial frontal-orbital gyrus 18 2 16 -24 5.45 405 
Right STG 44 44 16 36 5.30 491 
Right IFG 47 46 32 -10 5.05 407 
Right Precuneus  23 6 -54 34 4.72 863 
Areas positively correlated with General     
Favourability       
   *no significant clusters        
Areas positively correlated with General 
Favourability x Absolute Gap       
   *no significant clusters        
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Supplementary Table 4.S2. Brain regions correlated with Absolute Gap, Update, and 
Absolute Gap × Update 
BA, Brodmann area. Statistics are based on a set threshold of height p < 0.001 (uncorrected), 
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE). Areas in grey italics represent significant peak (FWE) sub-






Location BA MNI coordinate  Cluster 
size   x y z Z 
Areas positively correlated with Absolute Gap       
dmPFC 9 -8 52 36 4.14 402 
Areas negatively correlated with Absolute Gap       
   Left postcentral gyrus 40 -58 -32 48 4.55 258 
   Left nucleus accumbens 25 -14 6 -12 4.50 843 
Areas positively correlated with Update       
   *no significant clusters        
Areas positively correlated with Update × Absolute 
Gap       
   *no significant clusters        
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Supplementary Table 4.S3. Brain regions correlated with Update, Favourability, and 
Update × Favourability.  
BA, Brodmann area. Statistics are based on a set threshold of height p < 0.001 (uncorrected), 
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE). Areas in grey italics represent significant peak (FWE) sub-
clusters/different regions within larger clusters. 
 
  
Location BA MNI coordinate  Cluster 
size   x y z Z 
Areas positively correlated with Update       
  *no significant clusters       
Areas positively correlated with Favourability       
   Left middle frontal gyrus  6 -42 0 42 4.45 443 
Areas positively correlated with Update × 
Favourability       
   *no significant clusters        
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Supplementary Table 4.S4. Brain regions correlated with Absolute Gap separately for 
each condition. 
BA, Brodmann area. Statistics are based on a set threshold of height p < 0.001 (uncorrected), 
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE). 
Location BA MNI coordinate  Cluster 
size   x y z Z 
Japanese Favourable: Areas positively correlated 
with Absolute Gap       
   *no significant clusters        
            
Japanese Unfavourable: Areas positively correlated 
with Absolute Gap       
   *no significant clusters        
South Korean Favourable: Areas positively 
correlated with Absolute Gap       
Left superior frontal gyrus (SFG) 8 -14 36 56 4.28 756 
Left Precuneus 7 0 -56 36 4.45 200 
South Korean Unfavourable: Areas positively 
correlated with Absolute Gap       
   *no significant clusters        
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Supplementary Table 4.S5. Brain regions associated with Absolute Gap for 
Favourable>Unfavourable trials, and Unfavourable>Favourable trials 
BA, Brodmann area. Statistics are based on a set threshold of height p < 0.001 (uncorrected), 
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE). Areas in grey italics represent significant peak (FWE) sub-
clusters/different regions within larger clusters. 
 
  
Location BA MNI coordinate  Cluster 
size   x y z Z 
Favourable>Unfavourable: Areas positively 
correlated with Absolute Gap       
   *no significant clusters        
            
Unfavourable>Favourable: Areas positively 
correlated with Absolute Gap       
   dmPFC 8 6 38 48 4.35 238 
   Left IFG  48 -48 18 22 5.38 1137 
       Left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 44 -52 16 42 5.01  
   Right MFG 6 40 8 58 4.69 607 
   Right middle occipital gyrus (MOG) 19 32 -66 32 3.92 235 
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Full list of Scenarios 
 
South Korean Positive (Japanese alternative simply switched the nationality involved from 
Japanese to South Korean)  
1. Would you be willing to help up a Japanese person in public if they fell over? 
2. Would you be willing to share a post on Facebook that compliments Japanese culture? 
3. If you accidently ripped your friends favourite scarf, would you tell them truthfully 
what had happened and offer to buy them a new one? 
4. Do you believe that showing equal respect to everyone, no matter their class or 
ethnicity, is more important to educate into society than academic education? 
5. Do you believe it is justified for a university lecturer to tell students that it’s always 
wrong for governments to not attempt to solve tension between Korea and Japan? 
6. Do you believe it is a good lesson for a mother to teach her children that if any of 
their friends at school don’t have any lunch, they should always share their lunch? 
7. Would you be willing to accept a Facebook friend request off a Japanese person you 
met on a trip?  
8. If you found your friend posting offensive tweets about Japanese people, would you 
try to stop it? 
9. If you saw a bird caught in some litter at the side of the road, would you pull over to 
help it? 
10. Would you remain calm and polite despite a train passenger being extremely rude 
towards you due to a misunderstanding over a train seat? 
11. Do you believe it is a positive thing that a husband chooses to stay home from work to 
take care of his sick child while his wife had an important meeting? 
12. Would you be willing to regularly give some food to homeless people? 
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13. If someone at work was wanting to get promoted so they could earn more money to 
provide for their family, would you be willing to help them? 
14. Would you allow your child to play with a Japanese child? 
15. Do you believe a college class that’s aim is to inform students on reducing 
discrimination towards the Japanese in general society is a positive thing? 
16. Do you believe it is a positive thing for males and females to earn equal pay? 
17. Do you believe it is a positive thing that Korean companies hire Japanese people? 
18. Would you ever attempt to save a Japanese person from getting mugged if you could? 
19. If there was a big earthquake in Japan, would you be willing to donate foreign aid? 
20. Would you believe it to be a positive thing if a government meeting between South 
Korea and Japan occurred with the intention to build better relations between the 
countries? 
21. If a Japanese student lost their house keys, would you provide them with shelter for 
the night? 
22. Do you think it is a positive thing for a South Korean government to try to improve 
gender equality in a society? 
23. Would you be willing to give your seat to an elderly or a pregnant woman even if you 
are very tired? 
24. If you found a lost wallet on a street, would you be willing to bring it to a police 
station even if no one saw you picking it up? 
25. Would you be willing to wait to hold the door for an old person? 
26. If an old person holding a large suitcase is having trouble getting up the stairs, would 
you help this person go up the stairs? 
27. If natural disasters such as earthquakes occurred in other areas, would you decide to 
go volunteer to help their recovery? 
 
 139 
28. If a Japanese student asks you to teach them Korean, would you help him/her? 
South Korean Negative (Japanese alternative simply switched the nationality involved from 
Japanese to South Korean) 
1. If you saw racist material towards Japanese people on social media, would you feel 
positive about it? 
2. Do you believe it is acceptable that when intoxicated at a party people sometimes 
vandalise property? 
3. Do you think it’s ok to search for and watch YouTube videos that make fun of 
Japanese people? 
4.  If a person accidently drops some money, would you ever be willing to take it rather 
than inform them? 
5. If a person loses their temper badly because they received bad service in a restaurant, 
do you believe this behaviour is justified? 
6. Under extreme circumstances, would you ever be willing to launch a nuclear missile 
towards Japan? 
7. Would you ever start a riot in Japan if you thought you were receiving unfair 
treatment due to you being Korean? 
8. Do you believe it is justified for a Korean person to start a fight with a Japanese 
person because they insulted their country? 
9. Would you ever be willing to let a colleague take the blame for your mistake in order 
to avoid getting into trouble? 
10. Would you ever be willing to take credit for someone else’s work who has recently 
left the company in order to make yourself look good? 




12. Do you believe it is a positive lesson for a teacher to encourage students to betray 
their friends if it meant them getting ahead in their career? 
13. Do you believe it is justified that a young boy chooses to go out with his friends rather 
than staying home to help his grandmother whilst she was feeling unwell? 
14. Would you ever be willing to use someone else’s milk in the work fridge without 
asking who it belongs to? 
15. Do you believe it is justified that a grandfather doesn’t allow his grandchildren to 
watch a film because a Japanese actor stars in it? 
16. If you ever broke your mother’s favourite ornament, would you then lie that you did 
not break it when asked about it?   
17. Would you laugh at a joke your friend told you that is rude to Japanese people? 
18. Do you believe it is justified for a Korean tourist to write a blog while visiting Japan 
that is very offensive and paints Japanese people in a negative way? 
19. Would you ever deliberately not clear your tray from a fast food restaurant and leave 
it for someone else to do because you were too tired? 
20. If you were able to, would you ever be willing to push in front of someone in a que 
because you were in a rush? 
21. If a Japanese person stopped you to ask for directions, would you pretend you didn't 
know the way, even though you did? 
22. Would you ever avoid sitting next to a Japanese person on a train? 
23. In a South Korean city, a restaurant posts a sign saying "Korean Only" Do you 
believe this is justified?  
24. If you received more (cash) change than you should, would you walk away without 
reporting it?  
25. Do you think it is justified to text while walking on a busy street if you are in a rush?  
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26. Would you ever purposely drive too close to someone if you were in a rush to hurry 
them up? 
27. Would you ever jaywalk across a street if no one is watching you? 
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